EXAMINING POLICE PROTEST AND CONFLICT LIAISON PRACTICES IN CANADA

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The Crime Reduction Research Program

The Crime Reduction Research Program (CRRP) is the joint-research model in British Columbia between academics, the provincial government, and police agencies operated by the Office of Crime Reduction – Gang Outreach. The CRRP is supported and informed by a Crime Reduction Research Working Group which includes representation from the Ministry of Public Safety Solicitor General (represented by Community Safety and Crime Prevention Branch and Police Services Branch), the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit of British Columbia and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police "E" Division.

The CRRP focuses on investing in research that can be applied to support policing operations and informing evidence-based decisions on policies and programs related to public safety in British Columbia. Each year, the CRRP reviews submissions of research proposals in support of this mandate. The CRRP Working Group supports successful proposals by working with researchers to refine the study design as necessary, provide or acquire necessary data for projects, and advise on the validity of data interpretation and the practicality of recommendations.

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Executive Summary

Protest and conflict have increasingly become a common feature of political life in many countries, including Canada. The policing of protests is complicated, given that it sits at the intersection of two vitally important, but sometimes conflicting, political interests, namely maintaining public safety and the public's right to protest. Protests have historically been an important means through which individuals express support for, or dissatisfaction with, governmental policies or decisions. The right to peaceful public protest is generally held to be a fundamental attribute of participation in healthy democracies, and, in Canada, this right is protected through the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982) regarding the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. Thus, to the extent that public protests take place within the limits of the law, the police must protect citizens' rights to engage in such protests. Conversely, protests have the potential to, and often have, become disorderly, aggressive, or violent. In this way, protests can serve as threats to public order that the police have a responsibility to respond to. Balancing these dueling mandates has sometimes proven to be a difficult challenge for law enforcement.

This report reviews and assesses practices, methods, models, and philosophies found in the research literature pertaining to how the police communicate and interact with individuals and groups engaged in public protest or conflict in Canada. In this research, this process of communication and interaction is referred to "liaising" or "liaison" work. Although the focus of this report is British Columbia and Canada, as part of this project, the researchers reviewed approaches from other relevant jurisdictions, including the United States, Europe, and Australia. This report identifies and recommends, where appropriate, best or most promising practices in use in Canada and other jurisdictions to liaise with those engaged in public protest. More specifically, this report focuses on police liaison efforts with protest groups prior to protests, and, to a lesser degree, following protests. Police actions *during* protests involve different operational considerations and are, therefore, not considered here.

The results presented in this report are based a review of the research literature and extensive interviews with police executives and members in British Columbia, and with key members from marginalized communities in British Columbia. Interviews were conducted with police executives who had been involved with the drafting of current policies and procedures within their organizations and/or who had the responsibility for public protests. Interviews were also conducted with members who were responsible for implementing existing policies, as well as with members who were involved in liaising with protest groups and policing public protest. Of course, law enforcement is one only part of the public protest equation. To fully understand the dynamics of public protest, it was also important to solicit input from individuals and groups involved in these activities. Based on historical developments and emerging trends, a sample of individuals and groups that represented a range of experiences with public protests and conflict were identified. Interviews were conducted with individuals willing to offer their perspectives on best practices for liaising with the police. The interview themes focused on the protesters' perspectives on what might constitute "good" and "more problematic" approaches.

Several themes emerged from the interviews with the police. The first theme was that there was no single organisational structure designed to address liaising with community organizations or

protest groups among the various agencies that participated in the interviews. For the RCMP participants, the most common approach was the Division Liaison Team (DLT) at "E" Division RCMP. The DLT is a national program with individual detachment members connected to the DLT. Of note, being a member of the DLT was not a full-time RCMP position; rather, it was a secondary task that officers undertook. While DLT members recognised the value of the program and the relationships they developed in the community as DLT members, they were also keenly aware of the challenge of undertaking this kind of work 'off the side of their desks'. While there were differences in how municipal police departments were organized to address the liaison function of the police, many of the same issues reported by the RCMP participants applied to the municipal police department experience.

The second main theme was that there was no standard liaison training program for all police officers in British Columbia. Among the RCMP participants, it was reported that all DLT members were trained in community conflict. This included three mandatory courses that must be completed to be a DLT member. There was less consistency among the municipal police officers on the issue of training and how the department prepared their officers for liaison duties. The level of training specific to liaison positions varied across jurisdictions. Given the intricacies and complexities of liaison work, training officers for these various tasks can be extremely complicated, time consuming, and requiring consistent practice, updating, and upgrading.

Unlike the organisational structure and training, there was much more commonality and consensus about the mandate of the RCMP's DLT and municipal police department's Community Liaison Officers (CLOs). Overwhelmingly, participants spoke about the distinction between the role of a DLT member or a CLO and the role of other police officers. For a DLT member or a CLO, the primary responsibility was to mitigate conflict rather than enforcement. Participants saw their role as ensuring and respecting the public's right to protest peacefully, lawfully, and safely. To accomplish this goal, participants emphasised being proactive with stakeholders and protest groups, and on establishing and maintaining positive conversations and interactions with various groups in the community. This would include establishing, in advance, the protocols for protests; that is, an agreement between the police and protesters about what the protesters would be doing, where they would be going, how long they would be protesting, and how the police would engage with protesters to maintain public safety and ensure the safety of protesters, such as by rerouting traffic. For this process to work, DLT members or CLOs must have the authority to make these decisions on the part of their agencies.

In contrast to other units or teams within a police agency, it did not appear that DLT members or CLOs from different jurisdictions had a common set of partnerships. Instead, formal and informal partnerships were very jurisdictionally dependent. Some participants spoke of the value of their partnerships with Indigenous groups and environmental groups, while others spoke of the importance of their relationships with local governments and the business community. Regardless of the specific partners, participants indicated that open and transparent communication was essential, even if those interactions were not always positive.

Finally, the interviews also highlighted a number of challenges for DLT members and CLOs. For example, the dual policing role of these members was hard to reconcile. On one hand, these members have to spend a significant amount of time developing trust and relationships in the

community. On the other hand, the also must discharge their other responsibilities, which include the power of arrest and the use of force. This can irreparably damage the relationship between the community and DLT members and CLOs, making it impossible to continue with their role as a DLT member or a CLO in that community. Another challenge was the existence of actors and groups who did not want to operate or protest within the law, such as direct-action protesters whose primary purpose was to engage in unlawful protesting or to create conflict with the police that could be reported by the media. A third challenge was related to the need for human resources and how to best manage these resources. Participants commonly felt that more trained members were needed, especially members dedicated to the DLT and CLO role, rather than doing this work as an addon to their regular duties. The fact that there were not dedicated members was seen as directly contributing to the related challenges of getting police officers with the right combination of skills, abilities, and experiences to become DLT members and CLOs, and of retaining these officers.

The interviews with community members provided several important insights into the protest liaison process. Perhaps most importantly, community participants pointed to the need for police to address the historical barriers that have led to many of the issues facing Indigenous communities in the contemporary period. The historical context has laid the foundation for the existing tensions between the police and Indigenous communities. Community participants explained that some of the behaviours of the police, both past and present, fostered a great deal of mistrust towards the police within Indigenous communities. Many participants acknowledged that some police agencies had made improvements in terms of their handling of Indigenous peoples and issues, but they also indicated that much work remained to be done, and that this work would take a lot of time and a deep commitment from the police.

A second theme expressed by participants related to concerns about a perceived disconnect between the current foci and orientations in policing and the needs and concerns of members from the Indigenous communities. Community participants pointed to the pressing need for police practices to be reflective of the realities of policing Indigenous communities. Police agencies were seen as not being interested in the broader historical grievances, nor the larger issues affecting communities. Rather, they were perceived by the community participants as being more interested in showing that they were addressing particular concerns, such as improving community-police relations. In contrast, it was stated that Indigenous communities wanted to have more say in policing, with some wanting the police to address the bigger issues and the issues that were having the greatest negative effects on Indigenous communities. For example, some participants expressed a desire to delve into and address systemic issues, such as education, health, and law. Others referred to the importance of trauma-informed practices and cultural sensitivity.

The central element of successful police liaison work , from the perspective of community participants was the establishment of trust. Because of the actual and potential benefits of the liaison process, participants understood the importance of building and maintaining a positive relationship between police and the community. They emphasized that the relationship must survive and noted that the community and the police needed to maintain the relationship to address larger and more systemic issues that formed the basis of many protests and protest groups. Successful liaison efforts required that officers earn trust over time by demonstrating their commitment to their communities.

Community participants also identified several ways of improving the police liaison process. For example, at the organisational level, police agencies must be invested in the liaison process. An important facet of this investment was the dedication of sufficient resources to ensure that community concerns were being met. Participants were keenly aware that there was a "tug of war" around resource allocation, and that those programs and initiatives that did not have a commitment from the highest levels of the police agencies were much more likely to have difficulties securing resources. Simply put, the process of resource allocation was perceived as an indication of the value placed on the program by the police. In this way, from the perspective of the community participants, underfunded programs were recognised as being deemed less important and less worthwhile by police leaders. Thus, if sufficient resources were not invested in community outreach and liaison initiatives, this sent a message to the community that developing and maintaining these efforts was not a high priority for the police.

Community participants also suggested that the police needed to be more flexible and more proactive. More specifically, the liaison process would be improved if DLT members or CLOs were more engaged with the particular needs of the community. A core consideration here was one of follow-up. A lack of follow-up from DLT members, CLO officers, or those assigned to interact or liaise with the public with community members reduced critical information sharing, left community members vulnerable to future harmful behaviours, and suggested to the community that the police did not care about their concerns nor were the police a genuine partner in trying to address the concerns of the community.

In a similar vein, community participant emphasised the importance of collaborative relationships. Building a sustainable relationship between the police and the community requires more than merely increasing the level of police support for the process. To further the development of the liaison process, the relationship between the police and the community needed to move away from being police-driven towards more of a partnership between the parties. To many communities, the way the police agencies envisioned and carried out engagement efforts was simply a further extension of a very problematic and imbalanced hierarchical power structure. Too many initiatives came across as a police operation from the perspective of community participants in this study.

Lastly, recognizing that the liaison process requires a cultural shift in policing, participants pointed to a very important caveat in the process; namely, who the police use as a DLT member or CLO matters. Put another way, the potential success of liaison efforts is very much dependent on the individuals doing the work, on both sides. From the perspective of participants, for the liaison process to be successful, the police must ensure they select the right type of person to liaison roles. The qualities required of a good liaison officer included superior people skills, cultural curiosity and sensitivity, and an openness to learning. In addition, liaison officers should be familiar with and engage directly and routinely with the community. Finally, a critical element of community engagement was cultural awareness.

Based on the interviews, this study proposes several main recommendations.

1. It is likely useful for every RCMP detachment to have at least one dedicated DLT member and for municipal police departments to have at least one Community Liaison Officer or a Community Liaison team.

2. All police agencies should continue to develop and provide training that highlights the historical context of conflict between the police and specific marginalised groups. This training should include routine refresher or upgrading courses. Training should also include trauma-informed practices and cultural awareness and sensitivity. One way to address the concern around the cost and resources associated with providing this type of training is to engage with other agencies to share the training, which would also encourage the sharing of practices, tactics, strategies, resources, institutional knowledge and promote joint operations.

3. In the case of marginalised or protest groups, conflict with the police was primarily the result of a lack of trust in the police. Thus, in their interactions with these groups, DLT members and CLOs must focus on and work towards establishing or re-establish trust.

4. To better align community priorities and police practice, DLT members and CLOs and their respective police agencies should be more proactive in gathering community input and should institute more robust mechanisms for receiving and acting on input. This could be accomplished by routine public meetings with and surveys of the community.

5. The relationship between the police and marginalised communities/protest groups must move away from being police-driven towards more of an equal partnership between the parties.

Introduction

Protest and conflict have increasingly become a common feature of political life in many countries, including Canada. The policing of protests is complicated, given that it sits at the intersection of two vitally important, but sometimes conflicting, political interests, namely maintaining public safety and the public's right to protest. Protests have historically been an important means through which individuals express support for, or dissatisfaction with, governmental policies or decisions. The right to peaceful public protest is generally held to be a fundamental attribute of participation in healthy democracies, and, in Canada, this right is protected through the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982) regarding the freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly. Thus, to the extent that public protests take place within the limits of the law, the police must protect citizens' rights to engage in such protests. Conversely, protests have the potential to, and often have, become disorderly, aggressive, or violent. In this way, protests can serve as threats to public order that the police have a responsibility to respond to. Balancing these dueling mandates has sometimes proven to be a difficult challenge for law enforcement.

This report reviews and assesses current practices, methods, models, and philosophies pertaining to how the police communicate and interact with individuals and groups engaged in public protest or conflict in Canada. In this research, this process of communication and interaction is referred to "liaising" or "liaison" work. Although the focus of this project is British Columbia and Canada, as part of this project, the researchers reviewed approaches from other relevant jurisdictions, including the United States, Europe, and Australia. This report identifies and recommends, where appropriate, best or most promising practices in use in Canada and other jurisdictions to liaise with those engaged in public protest. More specifically, this report focuses on police liaison efforts with protest groups prior to protests, and, to a lesser degree, following protests. Police actions *during* protests involve different operational considerations and are, therefore, not primarily considered here.

In effect, this report outlines the approaches of law enforcement agencies that have had, and continue to have, experiences with public protest. It also includes the experiences and insight of those who engage with or participate in public protests from the community. The results from this research can be used to inform a best practice guide to be used by police agencies across Canada. In consultation with the Office of Crime Reduction and Gang Outreach (OCR-GO) and RCMP "E" Division Operational Strategy Branch (OSB), specific police departments and detachments from across British Columbia were selected for review. By providing an assessment of the various practices, methods, models, and philosophies that are currently being employed by different agencies, this report aims to improve the quality and efficacy of police efforts to liaise with individuals and groups engaged in public protest. It will assist police leaders in formulating better strategies for preventing or reducing disorder and violence associated with some protests. As such, the overarching objective of this project is to identify best practices that enable police agencies to manage public protest and conflict most effectively and efficiently.

Literature Review

Throughout the second decade of the 21st century, there has been a rise in political protests and larger-scale social conflicts globally (Anderson, 2018; Bond, Chenoweth, & Pressman, 2018; Gelardi & Sanchez, 2018; Paas-Lang, 2017). In many countries, including Canada, protest and conflict have become a common approach for pursuing political change (Paas-Lang, 2017). Several Canadian protests, including the Kinder Morgan pipeline protest (CBC News, 2018), the G7 protest (Valiante & Lowrie, 2018), and the Yellow Vests protest (Hames, 2019) are just a few examples of this recent proliferation. Similarly, Ottawa, the capital city of Canada, has experienced a substantial increase in large-scale demonstrations, marches, and protests, including The Women's March, The March for Life, SOS Vanier, and the "reoccupation" of Parliament Hill by Indigenous protesters (Paas-Lang, 2017). Given the frequency of protests in Canada, these events present a significant challenge for law enforcement. The policing of public protest is inherently complex considering that it concerns the intersection of two essential, yet occasionally conflicting, political interests; facilitating legitimate protest and protecting the public from unlawful assembly (Baker, 2008; Bourne, 2011; della Porta & Reiter, 2013).

Protests are an important means of promoting public debate and expressing opinions and grievances regarding governmental policies and decisions (Martin, 1994). In democratic countries, the right to peaceful protest is generally perceived as a necessary attribute of a healthy and functioning state (Vitale, 2005). As a result, this right is integrated into constitutional law. In Canada, the right to protest is guaranteed under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982). Accordingly, to the extent that public protests operate within the confines of the law, police officers are duty-bound to protect all citizens' rights to participate in such protests. However, the potential for protests to shift into destructive events with violent rioting and looting is evident. For instance, Canada and the United States have witnessed numerous peaceful protests that have transitioned into civil disobedience: (1) the 2012 Quebec university student protests following the Quebec Cabinet's proposal to raise tuition fees that eventually escalated into rioting, vandalism, police brutality, and mass arrests (Lambert, 2014); (2) the 2010 Toronto, Ontario G20 riot that led to the arrests of 410 individuals for a variety of offences, such as arson, assault, and vandalism (CBC News, 2010); (3) the 2015 Baltimore, Maryland protest following the death of Freddie Gray in police custody that resulted in Mayor Larry Hogan declaring a state of emergency after violent rioters inflicted approximately $9 million in property damage and injured 15 police officers (Stolberg & Babcock, 2015; Toppa, 2015); (4) the 2014 Ferguson, Missouri protest in response to the death of Michael Brown that elicited violent rioting after the grand jury decided not to indict officer Darren Wilson (Davey & Bosman, 2014); and (5) the 2020 series of protests that started in Minneapolis, Minnesota, in reaction to the death of 49-year-old George Floyd during an arrest by the Minneapolis Police Department (Deliso, 2021). The George Floyd protests eventually spread nationwide (e.g., Los Angeles and Memphis; Deliso, 2021) and internationally (CNN, 2020).

In the United States alone, between approximately 15 to 26 million citizens engaged in anti-racism protests against police brutality since the start of 2020 (Buchanan, Biu, & Patel, 2020). While many protests were peaceful across the country, some escalated into violent riots that resulted in 1 to 2 billion dollars in property damage claims (Zilber, 2020). In reaction to the George Floyd protest across America, then President Donald Trump stated: "I am mobilizing all available federal

resources, civilian and military, to stop the rioting and looting, to end the destruction and arson and to protect the rights of law-abiding Americans, including your Second Amendment rights…If a city or state refuses to take the actions necessary to defend the life and property of their residents, then I will deploy the United States military and quickly solve the problem for them" (Gregorian, Kube, & Lee, 2020, paras. 2-5). In instances such as these, protests can serve as threats to public order, safety, and security; threats to which to the police have the responsibility to respond (Baker, 2008). Consequently, public order policing in Canada seeks to establish an equilibrium between the exercise of basic civil rights outlined in section 2 of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (1982), such as freedoms of expression, association, and peaceful assembly, and the requirement of the police to enforce the law, such as breach of the peace or unlawful assembly (*Criminal Code*, 1985). Finding the proper balance between these conflicting mandates poses a difficult challenge for law enforcement (Baker, 2008). In response, different agencies have employed several strategies to achieve this balance.

PUBLIC ORDER POLICING

As outlined above, policing public protests requires law enforcement to strike a balance between protecting civil rights, maintaining public order, and enforcing the law (McCartney & Parent, 2015). To achieve these goals, police executives must establish a risk management plan to inform police officers on how to appropriately respond to changing crowd dynamics (Waddington & King, 2005). Public order policing can be unpredictable (Baker, 2008). Consequently, police agencies secure various tools, methods, and strategies to prepare for such protests. Some police agencies have acquired cutting-edge paramilitary technology and specialized riot response units to prepare for worst-case scenarios (McCulloch, 2001), while other agencies utilize proactive strategies, such as Protest Liaison Officers, to encourage police-protester cooperation (Whelan & Molner, 2019). Furthermore, some police organizations have specialized officers trained in crowd psychology who employ tactics (e.g., 'Meet and Greet' or dialogue-based strategies) to generate positive police-crowd interactions (Vancouver Police Department, 2011), whereas others utilize risk assessment tools (Howe & Monaghan, 2018) or social media and big data to evaluate threat levels (Dencik, Hintz, & Carey, 2018).

Given this, several different types of strategies for crowd control and management exist. Police agencies vary greatly in terms of which strategies, models, or methods they choose to employ. Generally, responses range across several spectra, including strategies that fall along a continuum of *soft* tactics, such as 'Meet and Greet' strategies, to *hard* tactics that can include military-style tactics that rely on riot gear, tear gas, batons, water cannons, and rubber bullets, in addition to strategies that are proactive or reactive in nature (Davies & Dawson, 2018).

SOFT APPROACHES

Soft tactics, also referred to as low-profile policing, the Madison Method, the Cardiff Approach, 'Meet and Greet', dialogue policing, and negotiated management are based on the fundamental notion of police-protester relationship building and communication (Davies & Dawson, 2018; Whelan & Molner, 2019).

The Madison Method was developed by former Chief of Police, David Couper, in Madison, Wisconsin. This model of public order policing is centred around securing citizens' first amendment rights to free speech, expression, and assembly (Couper, 2012). Under the Madison Method, police agencies adopt the underlying principle that it is the obligation of the police to treat citizens as customers to serve (Masterson, 2012). During the late 1960s to early 1970s, the Madison Method was implemented as a public order policing strategy to effectively manage protests. The Madison Method focuses on the key components of: (1) Communication - pre-emptive and reciprocal police-demonstrator problem-solving dialogue; (2) Negotiation and Education - open and continuous communication between police and demonstrators regarding protest boundaries and a commitment toward the education of police officers on effective soft crowd management techniques; (3) Protection - tactical or emergency response units nearby on reserve; and (4) Visibility, Leadership, and Preparation - officers are identifiable and police commanders are visible and prepared to command and manage changing crowd dynamics (Couper, 2012; Masterson, 2012).

In an evaluation by Wycoff and Skogan (1993; 1994) and the National Institute of Justice, the quality of policing of Madison, Wisconsin Police department was assessed over a three-year period from 1987 to 1989. Although the Madison Method was not directly evaluated, a major component of the Madison Method was included in the implementation of a new organizational strategy within an "Experimental Police District". The new organizational objectives included *quality management*, a type of participatory management style aimed at employee participation in decision-making processes within an institution, and *community-orientated policing* to develop a "more responsive service to the community" (Wycoff & Skogan, 1993, p. 1). These objectives overlap with major guiding principles in the Madison Method whereby officers are encouraged to "get closer to the people we serve" (Wycoff & Skogan, 1993, p. 6) and to "teach employees to view citizens as a customer to be satisfied" (Wycoff & Skogan, 1994, p.372). The findings from this evaluation suggested that participatory management may improve the attitudes of officers towards issues related to internal and institutional change and, by extension, benefit citizens in the community through a broader acceptance of external or community-based changes. Wycoff and Skogan (1993; 1994) argued that police officers who are valued as internal customers capable of participating in problem-solving within their law enforcement agency were more likely to perceive citizens as external customers equally capable of participating in problem-solving community-based issues. By extension, similar benefits can be expected in the Madison Method because engaging in a proactive participatory problem-solving relationship between police and protest organizers can act to improve attitudes and communication that can contribute to a more cooperative and respectful negotiation process when challenges or protests arise.

THE CARDIFF APPROACH

The Cardiff Approach is a public order policing model developed from two compliance theories, the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) and Procedural Justice Theory (PSJ) (Stott, Hoggett, & Pearson, 2012). The ESIM is based on the premise that perceived police illegitimacy or unfairness can escalate crowd violence by creating a perception of united opposition among members of the crowd. The PSJ suggests that, in general, individuals will comply with law enforcement officers

when officers exemplify fairness and justice and are perceived by the public to be legitimate (Stott et al., 2012). Researchers conducted a three-year longitudinal ethnographic study on a group of football fans from the United Kingdom, the Cardiff City Football Club (CCFC). During football games, the CCFC were notorious for engaging in hooliganism, including boisterous, violent, disobedient, or destructive behaviour (Stott et al., 2012). After two major riots involving numerous CCFC fans in 2001 and 2002, new procedures were introduced by the police in their response towards CCFC fans that centred around proportionality, dialogue, and facilitation-based policing strategies. Stott et al. (2012) found that the transition away from hard police tactics, such as force and deterrence, coincided with a rapid reduction in arrests and hooliganism over several football seasons. This reduction in violence and disobedience was attributed to an increase in police legitimacy through dialogue and facilitation-based strategies. However, positive outcomes were found to be jeopardized when the use of the police was deemed inappropriate or illegitimate by the public (Stott et al., 2012); for example, if the police employed force that was perceived by a crowd as indiscriminate or disproportionate.

DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATED MANAGEMENT

The philosophy behind dialogue policing and negotiated management the reduction of occurrences of deindividuation or situations where individuals experience a loss of self-identity and adopt a 'mob mentality,' thus enabling transgressive behavior (Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952). Positive relationships with protest organisers are meant to decrease anonymity and cultivate self-regulatory behaviours among protesters. In essence, protesters manage themselves (Baker, 2005; 2008). In addition, the key over-arching elements of the negotiated management model trace back to the Eisenhower Commission and include four broad features: (1) the perception that protests and protesters embody an essential part of the political sphere; (2) the recognition that lawful protest is protected under constitutional law; (3) the utilization of aggressive/forceful police tactics as a final option due to their ineffectiveness in de-escalating violence or promoting compliance; and (4) the pre-emptive planning of protest dates, times, and locations, as well as permit allocation (as cited in Sombatpoonsiri, 2015). Contrary to hard tactics, soft approaches depend on strategies of communication, cooperation, and threat assessment (Adang & Cuvelier 2001). Although promising, these tactics are contingent upon the willingness of protesters to liaise with police. In these cases, police need to demonstrate a genuine consideration for protesters' rights and interests (Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012).

HARD APPROACHES

Hard tactics include high-profile policing, military-style strategies, no-go areas, and strategic incapacitation, and are centered around the principles of strict/coercive enforcement of the law (Davies & Dawson, 2018; Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2013; Whelan & Molner, 2019). *Hard* tactics can include the arrest, removal, or ban of high-risk individuals, such as protest agitators, leaders, or fighters, to prevent civil disobedience (Westley, 1957). In addition, police may outright discourage protest participation by issuing warnings or threats of violence (Baker, 2008). In effect, under these approaches, violent or disorderly protests are met with more aggressive tactics that can include the use of tear gas, batons, water cannons, and rubber bullets to disperse or suppress discordant

protesters (Wahlstorm, 2007). While necessary in certain situations, *hard* tactics have been criticized for being oppressive and infringing on citizens' fundamental rights to assemble (McCartney & Parent, 2015).

To date, there does not appear to be a consistent strategy for dealing with public protest across law enforcement agencies. Given the growing need for reliable practices for crowd management/control across law enforcement agencies, the purpose of this literature review is to determine the best, promising, and common practices available for liaising and dealing with public protest and conflict within the current literature.

TRENDS IN POLICING PROTEST MODELS: ESCALATED FORCE, NEGOTIATED MANAGEMENT, AND STRATEGIC INCAPACITATION

Many researchers have suggested that public order policing has gradually transitioned from *hard* tactics embedded within the traditional escalated force model to more *soft* tactics unique to the negotiated management model (Fernandez, 2008; Gorringe & Rosie, 2013; Stott, Scothern, & Gorringe, 2013). Based on growing concerns over the use of aggressive police tactics in the escalated force model, the development of negotiated management emerged as an innovative strategy to facilitate agreements between police and protesters (Gillham & Noakes, 2007). The principles embedded in the negotiated management model focus on preventative strategies, including cooperation, leniency for minor disruptions, and fewer military-style tactics. Nonetheless, the negotiated management model also initiated the implementation of authorized cooperation between protesters and liaison/negotiation officers, such as requiring a prearranged date, duration, and location of a protest (Gillham & Noakes, 2007). Although generally regarded as the standard model for police-protester interactions, negotiated management did not completely abrogate the escalated force model (Bourne, 2011).

The negotiated management model was challenged after a series of large anti-globalization protests at the 1999 Seattle, World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference, also known as the 'Battle of Seattle', during which protesters appeared to be leaderless, volatile, and unwilling to communicate with officers (Fernandez, 2008). The four-day Battle of Seattle involved violent confrontations between protesters and the Seattle Police Department (SPD). Approximately, 50,000 protesters occupied the streets of Seattle, overwhelming the SPD. As a result, the first day of the WTO conference was rescheduled (Herbert, 2007).

Overall, negotiated management tactics are only beneficial when both police and protesters are willing to cooperate (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008). As King and Waddington stated, "demonstrator groups [need] to have some degree of organizational structure, including representatives with the requisite authority to enter into negotiation with the police" (2005, p. 262-263). In effect, without a clear representative, it is difficult to see how negotiations can occur (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008). Furthermore, the implicit labelling of protesters as being either legitimate (i.e., good, flexible, or communicative) or illegitimate (i.e., bad, inflexible, or uncommunicative) by police can act to intensify situations. Specifically, this form of stereotyping creates a presumption of how certain individuals will behave or respond that can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy, especially when

individuals are labelled uncooperative or prone to disorderly behaviour by the police (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008).

Up until the end of the 1990s, the negotiated management model continued to be the predominant public order policing strategy (della Porta & Reiter, 1998). However, since then, an additional strategy has surfaced: the strategic incapacitation model (Gillham et al., 2013). Strategic incapacitation is an integrated model incorporating: (1) soft approaches of dialogue-based or liaison policing; (2) hard approaches, such as intelligence gathering and surveillance; and (3) paramilitary approaches, such as the increased use of less-lethal weapons, targeted arrests, and no-go zones (Gillham & Noakes, 2007). Researchers have suggested that even though broad patterns in policing tactics are observable over time, generally, law enforcement utilize a range of strategies (de Lint & Hall, 2009), such as the combination of strategic incapacitation and negotiated management techniques (Waddington & King, 2007).

Strategic incapacitation gained traction after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. (Gillham, Edwards, & Noakes, 2013). These techniques, also known as 'repertoires of protest control', were utilized by police during the 'Occupy Wall Street' movement in September 2011 in Lower Manhattan, New York, after the creation of the Zuccotti Park protester campsite (Gillham et al., 2013). The Occupy Wall Street movement assembled numerous times over a two-month period, surrounding the financial district. Protesters were voicing their grievances regarding the inadequate governmental action during the 2008 financial crisis and the growing income inequality in America. Various strategic incapacitation tactics were used by police during these events. For example, spatial containment, including hard zones, soft zones, free-speech zones, video surveillance, and information management were all utilized (Gillham et al., 2013).[1]

In Gillham et al.'s (2013) field research on the 2011 'Occupy' protesting events, the authors discovered an "iterative and interactive process" between police and protester, as each side attempted to employ innovative strategies to circumvent repressive tactics from the opposing side (p. 98). Similarly, other researchers have shown that strategic incapacitation tactics, inclusive of actuarial assessments,[2] can be "highly antagonistic forms of policing that are grounded in a rationality that seeks to demobilize and delegitimize" (Howe & Monaghan, 2018, p. 328). Thus, these tactics warrant further research to determine whether they undermine citizens' right to protest (Gillham et al., 2013). Of note, it remains clear that some protester groups perceive these tactics as a risk and challenge that jeopardizes their fundamental rights (Howe & Monaghan, 2018).

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[1] *Spatial Containment* is a public order policing strategy whereby police use barricades and fencing to prepare for potential rioting during a protest or event. These containment techniques are used to divide public space into separate zones to control and regulate citizen access to certain areas. There are several types of spatial containment zones. *Hard Zones* are prohibited areas that have a high degree of police presence and surveillance. *Soft Zones* are spaces adjacent to hard zones where first amendment rights, i.e., free speech, expression, and assembly, are momentarily discontinued for the duration of a protest. *Free-Speech Zones* are the formation of 'access-controlled' designated areas where protesters are permitted to demonstrate (Arrigo, 2018). *Information Management* is the temporary prohibition of information creation and dissemination (Gillham et al., 2013).

[2] Actuarial assessments are a risk assessment instrument used to evaluate individual or group risk for disorderly or violent conduct (Howe & Monaghan, 2018).

PROMISING STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING PROTEST AND CONFLICT

To identify effective strategies for managing protest, conflict, and escalating violence, researchers have investigated the association between police strategies and crowd behaviour. A connection between soft tactics, such as dialogue-based strategies, and non-violent crowd behaviour has been consistently observed (as cited in Davies & Dawson, 2018) across several different protesting events; the G20 summit in London (Gorringe et al., 2012), the Goteborg European NATO Union summit (Wahlstorm, 2007), and the 1999 'Battle of Seattle' (Waddington, 2007). In comparison, an examination of the 2000 European football championship revealed that high-profile policing tactics were associated with rioting behaviour. Researchers inferred that the strict authority persona exhibited by police officers (e.g., formal and cautious) during the championship event increased transgressive behaviour among crowd members (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001).

'MEET AND GREET' APPROACH

Similar to the Madison Method, the Cardiff Approach, and other dialogue-based methods, the 'Meet and Greet' Approach is based on the philosophy that when police proactively establish relationships with crowd members the likelihood that the crowd will become disobedient decreases. The police generate psychological bonds with individuals in the crowd by engaging in positive interactions and exuding a calm, helpful, and friendly demeaner (Masterson, 2012; Westley 1957). These kinds of positive interactions make it difficult for individuals in the crowd to behave aggressively or antagonistically towards the police, as these pre-established bonds inhibit anonymity or solidarity among crowd members (Masterson, 2012; Westley 1957). To be effective, the 'Meet and Greet' technique requires several components: (1) police need to engage in conversation with individuals in the crowd; (2) individuals in the crowd need to be willing to reciprocate; and (3) police need to demonstrate a positive attitude, as well as safeguard the crowd's interests and rights (Gorringe et al., 2012).

To illustrate the effectiveness of soft tactics, the 'Meet and Greet' proactive approach utilized by the Vancouver Police Department (VPD) proved successful for managing large crowds during the 2010 Winter Olympics (Vancouver Police Department, 2011). Uniformed officers interacted with crowd members to create a positive, safe, and family-friendly environment. Many officers were seen smiling, taking photos, and high fiving eventgoers (Vancouver Police Department, 2011). While these tactics are promising, under certain circumstances where the crowd is demonstrating hostile or violent intent, soft tactics have limitations (Davies & Dawson, 2018). For instance, 'Meet and Greet' tactics were utilized during Game Seven of the 2011 Stanley Cup Playoffs in Vancouver with disastrous outcomes. The downtown Vancouver core became overpopulated with many young, intoxicated individuals who were determined to cause problems, in addition to those who travelled to the downtown core with the intent to cause trouble (Vancouver Police Department, 2011). As the situation grew more disorderly, police officers on the scene were unable to respond successfully. Backup squads and the Public Safety Unit were called to diffuse the situation. Due to the high-level of civil disobedience, harsher tactics were ultimately used, such as tear gas, to gain control of the situation (Vancouver Police Department, 2011).

Analyses of the 2011 Stanley Cup Riot offer suggestions for improving crowd control and conflict under the 'Meet and Greet' approach that can be applied to protesting situations (Davies & Dawson, 2015, 2018; Vancouver Police Department, 2011). 'Meet and Greet' strategies require enough police officers to have the desired effect and the timing of when one uses 'Meet and Greet' strategies is very important. Moreover, 'Meet and Greet' is suitable initially, but it is important to recognize that 'Meet and Greet' strategies might not be appropriate for all events and crowd types. Finally, it is critical for the police to have appropriate preparation in place for disorderly situations.

While the Vancouver Police Department was praised for effectively applying 'Meet and Greet' tactics during the 2010 Olympics (Police Executive Research Forum, 2011), one approach is not applicable to all cases (Davies & Dawson, 2015). The generic application of any type of crowd management strategy without considering various contextual or historical factors, such as past and current police-protester relations, the type of event, or the type of protester group, may prove to be ineffective (Davies & Dawson, 2015; Gorringe & Rosie, 2008). To exemplify, Gorringe and Rosie (2008) interviewed police officers and protesters prior to, during, and before the 2005 G8 summit events in Scotland. They found that negotiated management techniques cannot be imported wholesale. Instead, the success of these techniques was contingent upon the cooperation of all parties involved, police-protester history, police knowledge, and the methods of interaction. Several issues were present at the 2005 G8 summit events in Scotland that acted to undermine negotiated management strategies, including: (1) police preconceptions of protester groups being 'illegitimate' or 'bad'; (2) police statements that the town of Auchterarder did not have the capacity to accommodate a large protesting event; (3) police or protester preparations in anticipation for violence; and (4) police 'negotiating' from an uncompromising standpoint. For example, voicing pre-emptive restrictions, such as "there simply isn't the infrastructure or space", does not signify a willingness to negotiate on the part of the police or the city (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008, p. 195). Moreover, preparing in anticipation for violence on the part of police or protesters signals mistrust that can serve to compromise dialogue-based strategies. In addition, the arrest of three self-proclaimed protest organizers/negotiators on Princes Street, who were attempting engage in dialogue with police, did not show a desire to negotiate. These preparations, statements, or preconceptions can generate a self-fulfilling prophecy leading to violent police-protester confrontations (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008). Yet, generally, researchers have supported the use of soft tactics as the preferred preventative approach (Gorringe et al., 2012; Maguire, 2015; Waddington, 2007; Wahlstorm, 2007).

LIAISON-BASED POLICING

In 2009, after much controversy surrounding the violent anti-globalisation protesting events at the Gothenburg summit in Sweden (Peterson & Oskarsson, 2006) and the 2009 G20 summit in London (HMIC, 2009a; 2009b), Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) issued a two-part document with recommendations for policing protests in the United Kingdom (HMIC 2009a, 2009b). These protesting events were particularly violent and received a great deal of media attention. Specifically, the 2001 Gothenburg, Sweden summit involved a meeting of European Union (EU) members, including then-president George W. Bush, to discuss EU expansion (BBC News, 2001a). Approximately 25,000 individuals joined to protest the summit meeting that eventually

erupted into civil disobedience and violence leading to substantial property damage, the arrests of 459 protesters, the use of live-round gunfire by Gothenburg police, and 150 individuals requiring medical attention (BBC News, 2001b; CNN, 2001; HMIC, 2009b). Similarly, the 2009 G20 summit in London was a meeting of world leaders to discuss the global economy and financial markets (HMIC, 2009b). The demonstrations resulted in violent police-protester confrontations. Most significantly was the death of Ian Tomlinson, a passer-by at the G20 event, who suffered abdominal hemorrhaging after an unjustified assault by a police officer in riot gear (Edwards, 2009).

After reviewing these high-profile protesting events, the HMIC recommendations initiated several reforms in the UK. Perhaps the most significant was the development and implementation of Protest Liaison Officers (PLOs) (College of Policing, 2013a). PLOs are appointed with the duty of establishing positive relationships with protester groups in the community; that is, relationships that are grounded in mutual respect and trust. PLOs are motivated to understand protesters' intentions and to facilitate lawful/safe protests (College of Policing, 2013a). Furthermore, PLOs inform agencies as to the appropriate police response/presence proportionate to the risk associated with the event or specific protester group (College of Policing, 2013a). Stott et al. (2013) provided a detailed qualitative analysis of liaison-based strategies (i.e., the deployment of PLOs) utilized during six protesting events that occurred in London in 2012. These researchers found that liaison-based strategies were effective in reducing conflict, setting boundaries, and strengthening problem solving and negotiating capabilities during the protest (Stott et al., 2013). As a whole, liaison-based strategies were found to be successful at problem solving, decreasing conflict, setting boundaries, and mediating. The key elements of successful liaison-based strategies were outlined in Stott et al.'s (2013) analysis of the "Occupy" protest on May 15th, 2012 in London.[3] For instance, Stott et al. (2013) pointed to seven factors of liaison strategy success: (1) relationship building prior to the protesting event; (2) deploying the same PLOs during the protest event; (3) PLOs wearing different uniforms from police officers; (4) tolerating minor disturbances, such as occupying streets or disrupting traffic; (5) facilitating lawful protest; (6) negotiating or establishing limits to crowd behaviour through calm and respectful communication; and (7) educating and training PLOs on effective liaison-based approaches. Although liaison strategies were mostly effective at preventing or reducing disorderly conduct, limitations to this approach were apparent, including protesters' unwillingness to engage with PLOs, leaderless protest organizations, and protester identity, ideology, or past negative experiences with police. Moreover, if PLOs are tasked with 'intelligence gathering', this can lead to delegitimization; PLO-protester trust needs to be continually earned and reinforced to be effective (Stott et al., 2013).

Generally, protests are unpredictable events and, as such, policing tactics and strategies are often dynamic in nature in that they are dependent upon changing crowd behaviour and composition (Baker, 2008; Stott et al., 2013). While PLOs do not eliminate the transition toward harder tactics

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[3] The 'Occupy' movement assembled on Tuesday, May 15th, 2012 in front of the British Bankers Association at Russell Square in London to "Meet the 1%". The protesters were primarily concerned with the increase in income inequality in the UK and the increasing taxation burden among the middle class (Colvin, 2012).

when civil disobedience or violence ensues, these transitions are less likely to be necessary when PLOs are utilized (Gorringe et al., 2012; Stott et al., 2013).

Furthermore, the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (2015) published an assessment regarding the police response to the 2014 Ferguson, Missouri protests following the shooting death of Michael Brown. The report offered a community perspective and outlined numerous considerations embedded within the liaison-based approach. The following suggestions were generated after interviewing community members:

- Law enforcement should establish/uphold relationships within the community (e.g., with community leaders).

- Law enforcement should provide citizens with information regarding incidents that affect the community. This should be done in a timely manner to prevent the dissemination of misinformation.

- Law enforcement should proactively engage in the community to build trust and understanding.

- Law enforcement should foster communication within the community among various groups.

- Law enforcement agencies should develop community programs, such as police academies and advisory boards.

- Law enforcement should use proactive strategies during protests to build rapport with protesters and pre-emptively identify problems (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015).

Overall, liaison-based strategies have been shown to be effective at reducing conflict and problem solving (Stott et al., 2013). Still, some researchers remain cautious in labelling liaison/dialogue strategies as fundamentally progressive or beneficial (Gilmore, Jackson, & Monk, 2019). Rather, some researchers suggest that PLOs may act to dismantle rightful or legitimate protests by labelling some groups as 'uncooperative', especially those groups that do not participate freely in the dialogue process with police. As a result, these groups can be targeted for harsher police tactics (see Gilmore et al., 2019). More specifically, in a longitudinal ethnographic case study by Gilmore et al. (2019), interviews were conducted on the experience of anti-fracking protesters during the policing of the Barton Moss Community Protection Camp in Salford, Greater Manchester. The entirety of the case was examined over a three-year span from 2013 to 2016 inclusive of the initial protesting preparations and closing judicial proceedings. Several data sources were used to ensure data verification through triangulation[4], such as video recordings, court proceedings, case files, and other publicly available documents. The authors found that the implementation of dialogue-based policing during the anti-fracking protests was largely discretionary. Furthermore, there was also a noticeable disparity of power differentials between police and protesters. The anti-fracking protesters experienced both dialogue-based policing and forcible/hard policing through mass

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[4] "Triangulation is a powerful technique that facilitates validation of data through cross verification from two or more sources" (Honorene, 2017, p. 91).

arrests. From the perspective of many protesters, both policing methods were identical in function, as dialogue-based tactics were largely ineffective in establishing consistent or open communication. The lack of communication was due to several contextual factors: (1) the absence of a clear protester spokesperson; (2) a general mistrust (e.g., police claimed to want to "facilitate" anti-fracking protests; however, at the same time, they were deploying paramilitary equipment); and (3) the perception that the opposing group was unwilling to engage in dialogue (Gilmore et al., 2019). Overall, Gilmore et al. (2019) cautioned against the view of liaison or dialogue-based policing as inherently progressive and stated that, "our analysis suggests that dialogue policing can have a legitimizing function, enabling the police to define protest groups as irrational and 'uncooperative' and, therefore, ripe for violent policing" (p. 48). In a separate investigation by Gorringe and Rosie (2013) of liaison policing strategies during the 2009 Edinburgh's North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Parliamentary Assembly demonstrations, the authors observed several other issues that compromised liaison effectiveness. Specifically, these issues were ambiguous roles and responsibilities for liaison officers, the lack of adherence to dialogue-based policing by officers, and the use of liaison officers as intelligence gathers. The misuses of liaison-based approaches undermined police legitimacy. These findings may begin to explain why anti-fracking protesters in Gilmore et al.'s (2019) study stated that dialogue-based policing and forcible/hard policing were functionally identical. Despite these findings, it should be reiterated that the indiscriminatory implementation of any one type of public order policing strategy fails to capture the contextual subtleties that may undermine strategic effectiveness (Davies & Dawson, 2015; Gorringe & Rosie, 2008).

EVIDENCE AGAINST HEAVY-HANDED STRATEGIES

As previously stated, high-profile police tactics, such as officers in riot gear, are typically associated with an increased likelihood of eliciting aggressive crowd behaviour (Maguire, Barak, Wells, & Katz, 2018). This has been exemplified at several demonstrations, such as the Occupy Wall Street protests (Maguire et al., 2018), the 2014 Ferguson, Missouri protests (Thompson, 2014), and the 2000 European football championship (Adang & Cuvelier, 2001). The 2014 Ferguson, Missouri protests after the shooting death of Michael Brown provide a clear example of the problems associated with hard tactics embedded within the escalated force model. The aggressive military tactics employed by the St. Louis County Police and supporting agencies (i.e., St. Louis Metropolitan Police and the Missouri State Highway Patrol) intensified, rather than reduced, civil disobedience (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015; Thompson, 2014). Daytime protests were generally non-violent; however, by nightfall, a segment of the crowd started looting, destroying property, and throwing Molotov cocktails and rocks at police (Lamie, 2014). Police officers started indiscriminately deploying bean bag rounds, pepper-spray pellets, and Stinger balls (Institute for Intergovernmental Research, 2015). After the protests, many civil lawsuits were launched against the St. Louis County Police department, the St. Louis Metropolitan Police, and the Missouri State

Highway Patrol for haphazardly using excessive force.[5] Aggressive tactics were used on both peaceful protesters and rioters; legitimate peaceful protesters were thus prevented from exercising their First Amendment rights (Swaine, 2014).

The response from police during the Ferguson protests and the subsequent grievances from civilians attracted the attention of then-President Barack Obama, who implemented the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) to evaluate police strategies for dealing with protest and conflict in the U.S. One recommendation and two action items pertaining to demonstrations were outlined in the *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing* (2015). The primary goal was to begin to build trust between police and civilians, as well as to establish police legitimacy:

> *Recommendation 2.7*: "Law enforcement agencies should create policies and procedures for policing mass demonstrations that employ a continuum of managed tactical resources that are designed to minimize the appearance of a military operation and avoid using provocative tactics and equipment that undermine civilian trust" (p. 25).

> *Action item 2.7.1:* "Law enforcement agency policies should address procedures for implementing a layered response to mass demonstrations that prioritize de-escalation and a guardian mindset" (p. 25).

> *Action item 2.7.2:* "The Federal Government should create a mechanism for investigating complaints and issuing sanctions regarding the inappropriate use of equipment and tactics during mass demonstrations" (p.25).

In a critical analysis of the Ferguson protests and the *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing*, Maguire (2015) offered a comprehensive review of two major research areas for policing protests: (1) the psychology of compliance and defiance; and (2) crowd psychology. Grounded in psychological theory, Maguire (2015) provided a new empirically based vision for policing protests in the U.S. that focused on four elements: (1) education; (2) facilitation; (3) communication; and (4) differentiation. In terms of education, Maguire (2015) argued that crowds are diverse in nature. Many crowds are comprised of various subgroups with distinct social identities, such as group attitudes, values, goals, history, and ethical codes. Police need to educate themselves on subgroup social identities, including those with criminal and non-criminal backgrounds. Knowing who can be relied upon as allies is extremely important. Allies can act as arbitrators to reduce police-protester conflict.

With respect to facilitation, police should opt to facilitate rather than control lawful protests. If a protest becomes disorderly, arrests or spatial containment may be necessary. However, police should maintain open communication and explain the reasons behind their decisions and actions that need to be collectively beneficial, such as creating a safe environment and to safeguard protesters' First Amendment rights. In terms of communication, Maguire (2015) argued that it was necessary to establish effective police-protester communication. Friendly and open communication is a vital component for preventing and resolving conflict, as well as determining protester goals. If

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[5] Templeton, et al. v. Dotson, et al., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division, Case No. 4:14-CV-2019, Complaint (December 8, 2014).

the protester group is hostile or leaderless, establishing a professional, respectful, and patient demeaner is essential and can act to deescalate unruly situations. Finally, differentiation indicates that the police should make a distinction between lawful and unlawful protesters. In effect, police need to develop a differentiated response strategy for dealing with these two types of protesters as this would encourage lawful protest, while dissuading unlawful protest. Arrests, forcible tactics, and excessive spatial containment should be used parsimoniously.

Although promising, evidence of the implementation of Maguire's (2015) new vision of public order policing has yet to be identified. Nevertheless, components of Maguire's model, such as 'communication' and 'facilitation', overlap with the core principles of soft approaches, such as 'Meet and Greet,' the Madison Method, or the Cardiff Approach, which have been shown to be beneficial in reducing disorder, violence, or civil disobedience during protesting events (Police Executive Research Forum, 2011; Stott et al., 2012; Wycoff & Skogan, 1993; 1994). Thus, by extension, we can expect that at the very least these two elements of Maguire's new vision will be beneficial for crowd management.

Likewise, in a recent report entitled *Policing Protests: Lessons from the Occupy Movement, Ferguson & Beyond – A Guide for Police*, Maguire and Oakley (2020) provided additional details on their framework of general policing principles for protest and crowd management. The authors used law, psychology (i.e., ESIM), and criminological analyses of the past protesting movements (e.g., U.S. 2011 Occupy protests) to guide law enforcement agencies. The purpose of the guiding principles was to safeguard citizens' rights to protest while also employing protest management techniques that aimed to "secure voluntary compliance without triggering defiance or rebellion among protesters" (Maguire & Oakley, 2020, p. 11). Fair and respectful law enforcement procedures can facilitate protesters' compliance, cooperation, and obedience via perceived procedural justice and authority legitimacy. The ESIM posited that police agencies should save a "graded response" only using hard approaches for unruly protesters who engage in violence or property destruction, rather than using these tactics on the entire crowd. As stated previously, when law enforcement agencies use their authority to execute across-the-board hard approaches, this stifling technique can be seen as oppressive, leading to more tension or violent conflict. The authors further elaborated on their four main elements for successful police responses to protesters by providing examples of concrete steps:

- Education: law enforcement agencies can educate themselves on protester groups through open-source information (e.g., social media), traditional means (e.g., surveillance), or peer knowledge sharing (i.e., communication with other police departments).
- Facilitation: law enforcement agencies can facilitate peaceful protests by managing relations with protesters and the media to understand and balance each group's needs and expectations with respectful consideration.
- Communication: law enforcement can communicate with protester organizations, the media, and the public to encourage ongoing "proactive and positive communication between police and communities" (Maguire & Oakley, 2020, p. 68). For instance, during the "Philly is Baltimore" protest on April 30th, 2015, Chief Thomas Nestel III used Twitter to communicate with the public. One of his tweets reads: "A variety of causes are being represented at Dilworth Park. It is a peaceful expression of free speech. It's a beautiful day!" (Maguire & Oakley, 2020, p. 75).

- Differentiation: "whenever possible, police must engage in a differentiated response in which they continue to facilitate peaceful and lawful behaviour even when taking enforcement action against those who are engaging in violence, property destruction, or looting" (Maguire & Oakley, 2020, p. 76). This technique helps to foster police legitimacy – and thus, decreases the chances of pervasive social disorder erupting in the crowd.

CANADIAN PROTESTS

THE 2010 G20 TORONTO SUMMIT PROTESTS

Once per year, the G20 (or "Group of 20") summit forum assembles to discuss global financial stability and cooperation (Crowley, 2019). In 1999, the G20 organization was created after a serious global financial crisis (Crowley, 2019). The G20 organization facilitates international economic stability through reviewing policies that effect the global economy (Ramachandran, 2015). Currently, the G20 organization comprises finance ministers and central bank governors from around the world. In total, 19 countries and the European Union are represented in the G20 organization that include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, and the United States, as well as the European Commission and the European Central Bank (Crowley, 2019).

International summit meetings, like the G20 summit, are highly publicized gatherings that tend to attract large-scale anti-globalization and anti-capitalist protests (Seoane & Taddei, 2002; Toronto Police Service, 2011). For instance, "the largest policing operation in Canadian history (with extensive military involvement)" was the 2010 G20 summit in Toronto, Ontario (Monaghan & Walby, 2012, p. 654). A week of protests occurred during the G20/G8 events (Monaghan & Walby, 2012); yet the incidents that transpired on Saturday June 26th, 2010 would gain international media attention (Elliott, 2010). It was estimated that approximately 10,000 protesters marched through the downtown Toronto core on Saturday (Intini, Belluz, Dehaas, & Findlay, 2010). During the march, a subgroup of protesters diverged from the main march and went on a path of destruction through Toronto's business district employing Black Bloc (e.g., destructive or aggressive) tactics. For example, four police vehicles were set ablaze and storefront windows were destroyed (Byrne, 2010; Monaghan & Walby, 2012; Toronto Police Service, 2011).[6] While Black Bloc protesters unleashed destruction on the business district, police did not immediately directly confront them. After several hours, frontline officers began massive arrests. Protesters were indiscriminately targeted in one of "the largest mass arrests in Canadian history" (Monaghan & Walby, 2012, p. 654). In total, 1,118 arrests were made that day (Toronto Police Service, 2011). There were many

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[6] "Black Bloc members [those individuals employing Black Bloc tactics] either arrive at a demonstration already in black clothing or at some point change into black clothing. Black Bloc members cover their faces using balaclavas, ski masks, handkerchiefs, or other items before taking part in criminal actions, such as destruction of property. The uniform look makes it difficult to identify those responsible for the criminality since virtually all persons in the Black Bloc look significantly alike. As circumstances dictate, Black Bloc members can change out of their black clothing into less conspicuous attire in order to melt into the crowd and lessen scrutiny by the police" (Toronto Police Service, 2011, p. 10).

criticisms regarding the police response to G20 protesters; particularly, the indiscriminate police tactics (i.e., mass arrests) and violations of civil liberties (CCLA, 2010; Marin, 2010), including "unlawful searches, unlawful arrests, and improper detention, as well as issues related to the temporary holding facility" (McNeilly, 2012, p. 267). Eventually, two class-action suits were launched against the Toronto Police Service Board for civil rights abuses during the G20 protest ("G20 Class Action," n.d.).

In an analysis of the security intelligence strategies used during the 2010 G20 meetings in Toronto, Ontario, Monaghan and Walby (2012) examined documents from police and security intelligence organizations at various governmental levels (i.e., Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Toronto Police Service, Ontario Provincial Police, and the Integrated Security Unit's Joint Intelligence Group). Access to the documents were made via requests in accordance with the Access to Information Act (ATIA; federal organizations) and Freedom of Information Act (FIA; municipal or provincial organizations). A textual analysis was conducted on operational plans, threat assessments, and officer training materials. The main objective of intelligence gathering, threat assessments, and police training in preparation for the G20 protests was managing the 'anarchist threat'.[7] According to the authors, the 'anarchist threat' was determined by security intelligence organizations to be of primary concern, and, as a result, police strategies and training were tailored toward controlling this specific threat through strategic incapacitation and 'intelligent control' methods (i.e., hybrid strategies). This mutually reinforcing process is known as "threat amplification" (Monaghan & Walby, 2012).[8] Despite these concerns, the authors argued that security intelligence organizations confounded "anarchism with criminality" and "that the enfolding of security intelligence into international summit policing has intensified the practice of 'making up' threat categories and strategically targeting groups that fall outside the institutionalized spectrum of negotiation and accommodation" (Monaghan & Walby, 2012, p.653). Consequently, in these incidents, police form indicators for what constitutes typical anarchist behaviour or apparel; however, stereotyping in this way can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy and violations to civil freedoms (Gorringe & Rosie, 2008; Monaghan & Walby, 2012). For example, numerous G20 protesters reported that police justified arrests merely based on protester attire, i.e., hooded sweatshirts, backpacks, or black clothing (see example, *R v. Puddy* in Monaghan & Walby, 2012).

An after-action evaluation of the G20/G8 summit events in 2010 was conducted by the Toronto Police Service (Toronto Police Service, 2011) and ten recommendations were put forth to better manage major events in the future:

1. Train a team of specialized personnel dedicated to large-scale event support.

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[7] In a G20 officer training course, the anarchist threat was defined and characterized as Black Bloc members who ranged in age from mid-teens to early twenties but can have a few older members. Several members dress head-to-toe in black clothing, carry a backpack or bag, and wear safety equipment. The black uniform acts to signify solidarity and mutual aid (as cited in Monaghan & Walby, 2012).

[8] As de Lint and Hall defines, "Intelligent control requires: (1) the appearance of a liaison function to negotiate with and accommodate perceived leaders; (2) the use of surveillance to produce actionable intelligence; and (3) militarization" (as cited in Monaghan & Walby, 2012, p. 666).

2. Evaluate current training methods inclusive of the practical exercises, operational debriefs, and after-action recommendation procedures.

3. Implement clear incident management systems and applications to ensure decision-making personnel have distinct roles and responsibilities.

4. Review practices for managing Black Bloc strategies (or equivalent strategies), especially at large-scale events like the G8 or G20 meetings.

5. Implement practices and policies to identify, segregate, and remove individuals who present a threat to public order or safety.

6. Establish clear procedures, protocol, and functions for the dissemination of intelligence information, such as regular pre-shift information briefings with officers.

7. Establish future operational plans for large detention centres at major events that considers location, design, transportation procedures, computer systems, etc.

8. Enhance communication during large-scale events by establishing clear radio protocols.

9. Improve management abilities within areas related to community mobilization, media monitoring, and corporate communications.

10. Continue to utilize risk management initiatives before and after future events, e.g., pre-establish procedures and protocol with collaborative police organizations or supporting agencies.

Although comprehensive, the recommendations proposed by the Toronto Police Service overlooked the powerful influence of profile stereotyping demonstrated in Monaghan and Walby's (2012) analysis of public order policing during the 2010 G20 summit protests. The after-action document vaguely implied that preparations for future events include a review of practices for managing Black Bloc tactics and procedures for identifying, segregating, and removing at-risk individuals. These recommendations placed emphasis on the identification of a single target individual or group without a critical examination of the drawbacks associated with this tactic. However, in another G20 review by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD), the importance of educating police officers on not portraying every protester as aggressive or combative was noted (McNeilly, 2012). Future event preparations should consider reducing the fixation on a target individual(s) or group and highlight the repercussions associated with stereotyping (e.g., *R v. Puddy*).

Furthermore, the after-action Toronto Police Service document mentions the use of a community outreach team using liaison-based approaches prior to and during the G20 event. The evaluation stated:

> Members of the CRG [Community Relations Group] Activist/Protester Outreach Team worked with mainstream activist groups prior to and during the G20 Summit to facilitate peaceful and lawful protests. They also engaged in dialogue with individuals and groups whose publicly available information and history suggested a militant response to the G20 Summit. General ISU [Integrated Security Unit]/G20 Summit information was distributed to both types of groups along with offers of further assistance. For the most part, there was little positive interaction between the CRG and the more militant activists. It is important for the TPS to continue to engage with activists and protesters of all stripes to demonstrate our commitment to respecting the democratic rights of individuals (Toronto Police Service, 2011, p. 55).

The CRG team consisted of officers from the Toronto Police Service and the RCMP who were tasked with initiating, facilitating, and maintaining relationships within the community, specifically with residents, business owners, and protester groups or individual activists (McNeilly, 2012). The purpose of the CRG was to promote safety and security during G20 events and to reduce inconveniences for businesses and civilians (McNeilly, 2012). It remains unclear how CRG liaison officers communicated with more difficult protester groups prior to or during the events. As stated above, there was "little positive interaction between the CRG and the more militant activists" (Toronto Police Service, 2011, p. 55); however, the details of these communications are not readily available.

Despite the use of more soft tactics during the G20 events, the use of force was not off-limits. In a 300-page review of the 2010 G20 events, Director McNeilly of the OIPRD, stated that "what occurred over the course of the weekend resulted in the largest mass arrests in Canadian history. These disturbances had a profound impact not only on the citizens of Toronto and Canada generally, but on public confidence in the police as well…. It is fair to say that the level of force used in controlling the crowds and making arrests at Queen's Park was higher than anything the public had witnessed before in Toronto. In some cases, the use of force was excessive" (2012, p. i - vi).

The excessive force used by police officers during the mass arrests signified a law of retaliation, whereby violence was dealt with more violence. This resulted in a pattern of ever-escalating responses from both police and protesters (McNeilly, 2012). In addition, approximately ten occurrences of 'kettling' (i.e., containing, trapping, or confining) of large crowds of protesters was documented in the OIPRD report. Even though the majority of these kettled crowds were peaceful, police treated them as criminal and systematically started arresting people. As one individual expressed:

> The person with the megaphone asked to speak to a representative of the police because we were there to support the union, we didn't want to create any trouble. No one was being violent, we were all sitting with our hands in the air after we'd been kettled…this person with the megaphone was saying we'd like to leave, you know if you give us the opportunity, we will leave now…. then they just started arresting people and yelled to get back, and then all of a sudden, I was at the front and I was getting kicked in the stomach and in the chest (McNeilly, 2012, pp. 128-129).

Several other human rights violations were documented. For instance, numerous cases of unlawful detention and arrest were documented, and detainees were not given access to medical services, legal counsel, or food or water (McNeilly, 2012). These types of occurrences undermine overall police legitimacy and liaison-based approaches. Particularly, this de-legitimization and mistrust stems from liaison officers claiming to facilitate peaceful protests, while frontline officers infringed on protesters' rights. These two approaches can have the effect of sending the message that police will say one thing but do another.

THE 2011 OCCUPY MOVEMENT

On October 15th, 2011, during the global day of action, over 900 cities around the world organized peaceful 'Occupy' rallies, originating from the New York Occupy Wall Street campaign, to protest economic inequality and corporate greed. Various countries across the world were represented, including Canada, Asia, Europe, and the United Kingdom (Breau, 2014). In Canada, 20 cities held

rallies, including Vancouver, Victoria, Edmonton, Calgary, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Moncton, Charlottetown, and Halifax. Crowd sizes ranged from 125 individuals to over 4,000 (Breau, 2014). In a media advisory published by Marketwired, Sid Ryan, the president of The Ontario Federation of Labour, urged the Toronto Police Service to publicly announce their commitment to safeguard citizens' fundamental rights during the Occupy movement. Furthermore, Ryan stated that the police tactics utilized during the G20 protests in 2010, a year earlier, were shameful and led to the greatest freedom of rights violations since the enactment of the 1914 War Measures Act ("Media advisory-OFL president to Toronto police," 2011). Ryan outlined several G20 2010 violations by the Toronto Police Service that should be avoided in the upcoming Occupy demonstrations, including "arbitrary and mass arrests, kettling, tear gas, rubber bullets, beatings, and humiliating treatment" ("Media advisory-OFL president to Toronto police," 2011, para 3).

In late November 2011, the 39-day Occupy movement campsite in Toronto's St. James Park was peacefully dismantled after Ontario Superior Court Judge David Brown denied the Occupy protester's appeal to revoke the City's eviction notice (Coutts, 2011). Even though the Toronto Police Service were within their jurisdiction to execute the court eviction decision, officers were slow, cautious, and respectful in carrying out their orders (Routhier, 2011). As investigative reporters Kennedy, Black, and Taylor (2011) from the Toronto Star documented, "police were visible in the park [St. James Park] throughout the day-long eviction, but the non-confrontational, almost cordial, action was in stark contrast to the heavy-handed riot squads that rumbled through the city during the G20. Tightly wound and sleepless protesters had been bracing for a forceful police action, but it never came" (para 4-5). In contrast, other Occupy protesters in the city of Vancouver chose to re-locate after receiving eviction notices and moved their campsite from the Vancouver Art Gallery to the provincial courthouse ("Occupy Vancouver moves protest site a block away", 2011). These protest examples, the 2010 G20 and 2011 Occupy Movement in Canada, revealed the evolution of public order policing tactics from the perspective of one law enforcement agency.

THE 2020 VANCOUVER, B.C. ANTI-RACISM RALLY

On June 5th, 2020, between 5,000 to 10,000 citizens participated in an anti-racism rally in the downtown Vancouver core at Jack Poole Plaza in memory of George Floyd, who was killed during an arrest by Minnesota police. The demonstration was peaceful, although two "instigators" were placed in police custody for assault. Support for the demonstrations came from government officials. Mayor Kennedy Stewart published an announcement to the protestors stating, "I want to commend the organizers for shining a powerful spotlight on the injustices and racism that occur every day in our city and around the world. This is important work and I want you all to know I am listening" (see Judd & Little, 2020). The VPD cooperated with protest organizer, Jacob Callender-Prasad, to safeguard an anti-racism demonstration that occurred days earlier, on May 31st, 2020, at the Vancouver Art Gallery. This protest was also peaceful (Little, 2020). Jacob Callender-Prasad also helped to organize the Jack Poole Plaza rally and stressed that "we don't need to be violent, we don't need to destroy our community, we all work in our community. We all have friends who work in our community...we do not need more money being lost to violence in our communities" (Yoshida-Butryn, 2020, para. 9). The VPD supervised both rallies closely. One week later, a smaller

group of 90 anti-racism demonstrators supporting the Black Lives Matter organization barricaded the Georgia and Dunsmuir Street viaducts in Vancouver for over a 48-hour period. By and large, most protesters complied with officers' instructions to leave the viaduct; however, seven non-compliant protestors were arrested for mischief and intimidation (Kotyk, 2020).

In sum, there are numerous strategies for dealing with public protest across law enforcement agencies. Several protest cases demonstrated the benefits and limitations of various soft and hard approaches. Broadly speaking, police agencies adopt a range of integrated strategies for managing and liaising with protester groups. Although there remains a need for reliable practices for crowd management and control across law enforcement agencies, the purpose of the following section is to review the practices and procedures currently being used by agencies in Canada and other relevant jurisdictions, including the United States, Europe, and Australia.

EXISTING POLICIES AND PRACTICES

It is difficult to procure police department documents regarding decision-making processes and tactical response strategies for policing protests in Canada. The VPD and the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) appeared to have the most publicly available information regarding public order policing strategies, general guiding principles, and protesting models. Therefore, the following review was initiated using the VPD as a starting point as access to demonstration guidelines and an evaluation report of the 2011 Stanley Cup Riot with local and international departmental comparisons were readily available.

The VPD's *Public Demonstration Guidelines* (2017) document briefly outlined the general guiding principles of policing demonstrations in Vancouver. The VPD is responsible for supervising roughly 600 public events per year. These events include the Celebration of Light, which is an annual fireworks competition where approximately 400,000 Vancouverites gather around several West End beaches (e.g., English Bay, Kitsilano, Jericho etc.) to watch the display of lights (Boynton, 2018); the annual 4/20 protest, which is a large cannabis culture event that can be described as a combination of a protest, festival, and/or trades fair that draws roughly 40,000 people to the downtown Vancouver core and Vancouver Art Gallery (Lupick, 2019); and other small or large-scale protests or marches. In accordance with the agencies' organizational values of (1) Justification; (2) Proportionality; and (3) (least possible) Intrusiveness, VPD's public order policing guidelines are intended to prevent criminal acts, ensure safety, and maintain public peace. The VPD's public order policing guidelines incorporate the following strategies (Vancouver Police Department, 2017):

- Provide a friendly and professional approach to lawful protests;
- Have leniency for minor disruptions, such as occupying a downtown intersection;
- Maintain dialogue and communication with organizers, media, and the public;
- Engage in continuous improvement in terms of training personnel and improving strategies; and
- Be a "peace-keeper" in that enforcement actions should be targeted exclusively towards unruly individuals.

The VPD operates under the public order command and control model. This model was adopted from the three-tiered Gold, Silver, and Bronze United Kingdom National model for crowd management (Vancouver Police Department, 2011). The Gold, Silver, and Bronze model outlines the tactical and operational levels of command and control: (1) The Gold Command (e.g., superintendents) controls strategic decisions and resource allocation; (2) The Silver Command (e.g., inspector) manages the tactical response for an event or incident; tactical responses need to be in compliance with the Gold Command's strategy; and (3) The Bronze Command (e.g., operational front line) who executes the Silver Command's tactical plan at the event or incident (Arbuthonot, 2008; College of Police, 2013a). As indicated, decision making within the command-and-control model is centralized and hierarchical. There is a clear distinction between management (i.e., individuals in control of strategic decisions and resource distribution) and operational frontline responders (i.e., individuals who implement strategic plans) (Groenendaal, Helsloot, & Scholtens, 2013). In a mixed methods[9] evaluation of the preparation and execution of security during 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics, Plecas, Dow, Diplock, and Martin (2010) stated that, "overall, the command [Gold, Silver, and Bronze] model received very favourable reviews and seemed to work effectively in terms of organizational expectations, lines of authority, and responsiveness to security-related concerns" (p. 6). Nonetheless, officers at the Gold and Silver command levels reported issues pertaining to culture and learned behaviour within police organizations.

To clarify, given police agency culture, officers are often encouraged, conditioned, and accustomed to being actively and directly involved in situations. Consequently, individuals at the Gold and Silver level voiced challenges in suppressing their "natural inclination" to be directly involved in events that were outside of their role and responsibilities (Plecas et al., 2010, p. 7). Furthermore, many commanders stated that their need for ground-level information was sometimes confounded by their desire for active involvement; thus, crossing over "the boundaries of responsibility" (Plecas et al., 2010, p. 7). In addition, as projected, the overwhelming majority (90 per cent) of security management was done on-site by Bronze operational frontline officers who required minimal intervention from Silver or Gold commanders. Therefore, commanders from the Silver Area Command Centre and, even more so, the Gold Theatre Command Centre appeared to be operationally redundant, as incidents during the Winter Games never exceeded a low level of threat. Nonetheless, the authors cautioned that the redundancy between the Silver and Gold commanders should not be anticipated at other large-scale events, such as G8 or G20 summits (Plecas et al., 2010).

The VPD's *2011 Stanley Cup Riot Review* evaluated the similarities and differences among several police departments nationally and internationally. The report revealed that the VPD, the OPP, the Toronto Police Service (TPS), the Calgary Police Service (CPS), and UK police departments all

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[9] Several data collection methods were utilized by Plecas et al. (2010) in their evaluation of the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Canada, including: (1) interviews with community stakeholders; (2) survey data ($n = 1,514$) from police officers responsible for security; (3) content analysis of news reports related to security (e.g., The Province and The Vancouver Sun); (4) Quantitative analyses of crime rates; and (5) survey data ($n = 487$) from visitors or spectators of the Games.

operated under the Gold, Silver, and Bronze command model. Furthermore, similar tactics were discovered across Canadian police departments, such as the OPP, the CPS, and the TPS, including the "Meet and Greet" strategy and managing crowds with the least amount of force possible (see Table 1 below) (Vancouver Police Department, 2011). Although absent in the VPD's *2011 Stanley Cup Riot Review*, the RCMP uses the public order strategies and guiding principles from the OPP model (B. Smith, Informational Interview, June 17, 2019). Thus, the OPP public order guidelines provide the most accurate inference of the RCMP model.

As stated previously, the OPP operates under the command-and-control model (Vancouver Police Department, 2011) and promotes dialogue-based tactics using the OPP Provincial Liaison Team (PLT) (Ontario Provincial Police; OPP, 2019), similar to many other Canadian policing agencies, such as the VPD and the TPS. The roles of OPP PLT are to: (1) facilitate and safeguard citizen's rights to exercise lawful and peaceful protests under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*; (2) maintain the peace, ensure citizen's safety, and prevent property destruction; and (3) enforce the law under the Criminal Code, as well as any court ordered injunctions (OPP, 2019). The OPP encourages individuals or organizations to contact the PLT prior to a protest, as the goal of the PLT is to "help facilitate peaceful events" and "work with all of those affected by an event" (Ontario Provincial Police, Provincial Liaison Team; OPP PLT, 2019, p. 1). The OPP PLT (2019) outlines additional information for protesters regarding the limits of public demonstrations stated in the Criminal Code or other provincial or municipal statutes, such as the *Highway Traffic Act*. For instance, it states that protesters cannot barricade/obstruct a highway, disturb the peace, engage in rioting behaviour, use clothing to disguise their identity during an unlawful protest, violate court orders, harm others, or be in possession of a weapon (OPP PLT, 2019). The consequences for violating laws during a protesting event are also outlined; a criminal conviction could result in travel restrictions or limitations to employment or renting opportunities (OPP PLT, 2019).

Best practices for police responses to conflict are provided in the OPP document entitled, *The Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents.* The guidelines offer techniques to manage and resolve "both Indigenous and non-Indigenous issue-related conflict" (OPP Indigenous Policing Bureau, 2018). The main purpose of the framework is to encourage proactive policing via dialogue-based policing approaches to prevent conflict or critical incidents from arising. The dialogue-based strategies indicated in the OPP framework focus on developing and maintaining relationships based on open communication, respect, accommodation, and knowledge of the issues for each group involved. Regarding Indigenous occupations, protests, and demonstrations, the OPP promotes officer education on the unique historical and cultural context of Indigenous issues within Canada. For example, numerous elements might require careful considerations with respect to resource allocation or preparedness when policing Indigenous protest, such as:

- the strained relationship between law enforcement and Indigenous communities;
- rural or isolated communities;
- disagreement within the Indigenous community regarding key concerns;
- the length of the protest, occupation, or demonstration;
- solidarity protests occurring on a national or international level;
- the degree of protester determination and obligation to the issues; and

- police jurisdictional limitations when federal or municipal government policy or legal issues are involved.

There may also be the complexity of multiple group involvement, such as non-Indigenous groups or the media, regarding police communication and negotiation (OPP Indigenous Policing Bureau, 2018). The OPP provides clear behaviourally specific information regarding protester conduct, lawful and unlawful behaviour, consequences for violating laws or court injunctions, and the OPP's role in managing and facilitating protests within a dialogue-based and culturally sensitive framework. In addition, *The Framework for Police Preparedness for Indigenous Critical Incidents* sets out a clear framework application during three stages of the conflict incident cycle: pre-critical; critical; and post-critical incident (OPP Indigenous Policing Bureau, 2018). For example, within the pre-critical incident stage, officers are trained to look for situations that signify real or perceived discrimination or power imbalances. To address these issues, officers must be knowledgeable and engage in dialogue with Indigenous community members. In the critical incident stage, protesters typically show frustration that their concerns are going under-or-unaddressed. Officers are instructed to search for commonalities between the various parties involved to promote effective communication and cooperative problem-solving. Finally, the post-critical incident stage is the time for reflection through evaluation (OPP Indigenous Policing Bureau, 2018). These recommendations on peaceful and respectful conflict resolution in Eastern Canada contrast the hard Canadian police tactics employed during the 1990s Quebec Oka crisis. The Oka crisis involved nearly an 80-day long land dispute between the Mohawk peoples, the RCMP, Sûreté du Québec, and the Canadian army over the encroachment of industry developments on Indigenous lands. Police used violent militarized tactics (e.g., tear gas) to attempt to remove the barricade and Mohawk protesters. On July 11th, 1990, the rival parties exchanged gunfire and Constable Marcel Lemay was killed in the crossfire (Pindera & Jardin, 2020).

Regarding international policing tactics, although specific UK tactics were not assessed in the VPD's *2011 Stanley Cup Riot Review*, the College of Policing (2013a; 2013b) provided UK police departments with information on best practices/guiding principles for serving and protecting the public. The College of Policing (2013a) website outlined several different types of strategies. When compared to the VPD, the OPP, the CPS, and the TPS, the UK typically employed tactics that were integral to an integrated model, such as the strategic incapacitation model. These tactics included strategies, such as (College of Policing, 2013a):

- mandated Protest Liaison Officers – dialogue-based approaches;
- intelligence gathering and communication, such as through social media;
- the use of a negotiation team;
- the use of threat assessments; and
- hard tactics including the use of barriers and batons.

There are six core principles guiding public order policing in the UK that are specified by the College of Policing (2013b): (1) Style and Tone (e.g., impartial, yet approachable demeaner); (2) Communication (e.g., the use of dialogue-based approaches, information gathering via social media, and building trust/confidence/relationships with community members); (3) The National Decision Model and the Joint Decision Model (i.e., guidelines for decision-making); (4) Command (e.g., use the Gold, Silver, and Bronze command and control model as a framework for strategic, tactical, and

operational decision-making); (5) Proportionate Response (e.g., police responses must be appropriate and proportionate to the size and nature of the threat); and (6) Capacity and Capability (e.g., police support units in place for tactical response) (College of Policing, 2013b).

Similar integrated public order policing strategies are used in Australia. For instance, using Brisbane G20 in Australia as a case study, Whelan and Molnar (2019) showed that police departments in Australia tended to deploy a range of soft tactics through negotiated management, relationship building, and police liaison officers, and hard tactics, by gathering intelligence on social media, threat assessments, and spatial containment to manage large-scale protests. This combination of tactics was also evident in the UK. These tactics are indicative of the strategic incapacitation model. Comparably, according to Howe (2018), the RCMP have utilized the strategic incapacitation model in the past; specifically, actuarial risk assessment instruments in the policing of Indigenous protests in Canada. Nonetheless, Howe (2018) stated that it remains unclear whether "the extent to which these new risk assessment tools are currently in operation" (p. 326).

The 2016 Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) conducted a discussion forum with several police executives and specialists from all over the US on current and promising techniques for policing protests (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018). Numerous American police departments were represented, such as Ferguson and St. Louis, Missouri; Pasco, Washington; Oakland, California; Seattle; Boston; Baltimore; New York City; and Minneapolis. Of note, all these departments had experienced large-scale protests within the past few years (Police Executive Research Forum, 2018). Boston Police Superintendent Bernard O'Rourke delineated the typical strategies utilized by the Boston Police Department (BPD) when policing demonstrations that were consistent with the three-tiered model. The three-tiered model is based on graded-responses over three levels; first, dialogue-based, Meet and Greet, and negotiated management approaches are utilized by police officers in regular uniform; second, if disorder escalates, police officers on bicycle/motorcycle are deployed; third, if a riot begins, harder tactics are used, and the Public Order Platoons (POP) are deployed to disperse the crowd. These graded-response strategies are like those used by Canadian police departments, such as the TPS.

Overall, the aforementioned police departments employ a similar overarching graded-response strategy that begins with soft tactics and transitions to harder tactics when needed. By contrast, the emphasis on particular types of tactics, such as mandated Protest Liaison Officers, intelligence gathering, and risk assessments, tended to differ among the police departments. For instance, the RCMP "E" Division has implemented the Division Liaison Team (DLT) that connects with protest organizations or individuals through community outreach activities. DLT members take the Community Conflict Management Group (CCMG) course that concentrates on building communication, trust, respect, and cultural understanding between officers and organizations or protestor groups during three key protest phases: (1) pre-protest; (2) protest; and (3) post-protest. The overall objective of the CCMG course is to provide eligible officers (e.g., officers who demonstrate self-control and effective communication during high-stress situations) with a week-long "measured approach" training course for dealing with conflict. Eligible officers are identified by supervisors in the department and selected to receive CCMG training to learn de-escalation and conflict management skills (Seiden, 2017). In addition to CCMG, DLT officers receive training on theory, scenario-based exercises, and cultural/diversity training. Overall, DLT officers facilitate safe

and peaceful protests to ensure citizens can exercise their charter rights to protest and assemble lawfully (RCMP, 2020).

In sum, although there is broad consensus that protest liaison practices are becoming an increasingly important facet of policing, there is far less agreement on how these practices should be conducted. Taking a step further back, there is virtually no research on police liaison practices prior to protests. As the results in this report demonstrate, more policing agencies are attempting to be proactive in their approaches to communicating with marginalized groups prior to protests, primarily in an attempt to facilitate peoples' right to protest without protests getting out of control or turning violent. However, at present, these efforts tend to be ad hoc. There is limited guidance for police organisations on good practices for pre-event liaising. The purpose of this study is to review existing approaches and develop a more grounded list of good practices that police agencies can follow.

TABLE 1: POLICE DEPARTMENT PROTEST STRATEGY/MODEL COMPARISON

Location	Department	Model	Strategies
Vancouver, Canada	Vancouver Police Department	Public order command and control model (Gold, Silver, Bronze).	Meet and Greet (police and Public Order Unit (POU) officers in regular uniforms). Escalated force if needed, minimal amount of force required.
Ontario, Canada	Ontario Provincial Police	Public order command and control model (Gold, Silver, Bronze).	Meet and Greet (police in regular uniforms and POUs in level 2 attire – i.e., helmets on hand but not worn, no shields). Escalated force if needed.
Calgary, Canada	Calgary Police Service	Public order command and control model (Gold, Silver, Bronze).	Meet and Greet. Based on the level of threat police officers are deployed in various levels of dress – e.g., regular uniform with cap to defensive gear with shield/helmet.
Toronto, Canada	Toronto Police Service	Public order command and control model (Gold, Silver, Bronze).	Meet and Greet strategies. Noticeable police/community response officers on foot, bikes, or in police vehicles.
Canada	Royal Canadian Mounted Police	Information unavailable.	Have used strategic incapacitation strategies in the past, i.e., risk management and actuarial instruments for policing Indigenous protests.
England and Wales, United Kingdom	The College of Policing provides all police departments in the U.K. with guidelines and core principles.	Public order command and control model (Gold, Silver, Bronze).	Liaison-based approaches (i.e., mandated Protest Liaison Officers), intelligence gathering via social media or dialogue-based approaches. Escalated force needs

			to be proportionate, legal, accountable, and necessary.
Brisbane, Australia	Case study of the G20 protest	Information unavailable.	Dialogue-based strategies such as Protest Liaison Officers, intelligence gathering via social media. Escalated force needs to be proportionate, legal, accountable, and necessary.
Boston, United States	Boston Police Department	Three- tiered model – soft, medium, and hard approaches.	Dialogue-based/Meet and Greet approaches, i.e., regular uniform police officers. If disorderliness ensues then police officers on bicycle/motorcycle are deployed. Escalated force via Public Order Platoons (POP). POP use crowd dispersal and spatial containment techniques.

Methodology

The objectives of this project were achieved through predominantly qualitative research methods. The project can be broken down into several key elements.

Interviews with Police Executives and Members

Based on historical developments and emerging trends, a sample of police departments and detachments that represented a range of experiences with public protests and conflict were identified. Interviews were then conducted with police executives who had been involved with the drafting of current policies and procedures within their organizations and/or who had the responsibility for public protests. Interviews were also conducted with members who were responsible for implementing existing policies, as well as with members who were involved in policing public protest. The interview themes focused on the organization's policies, practices, models, and philosophies. The interviews were also designed to solicit input concerning possible improvement to existing policies and approaches.

All interviews were conducted by the principal investigators and a graduate student researcher. Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, all interviews were conducted either by phone or via online video conferencing. Participation in the interview was voluntary. Interviews were not audio or video recorded and all information provided by participants was anonymized prior to analysis.

Once the interviews were completed, all of the anonymized information was entered into a Microsoft Word document and qualitatively analyzed for common themes. The analyses focused on themes emerging from the specific content provided by respondents during their interviews, in addition to latent content illustrating any underlying themes.

In total, ten interviews were conducted with police executives and members from British Columbia.

Interviews with Members of Protest and Community Groups and Movements

Law enforcement is only part of the public protest equation. To fully understand the dynamics of public protest, it was also important to solicit input from individuals and groups involved in these activities. Again, based on historical developments and emerging trends, a sample of individuals and groups that represented a range of experiences with public protests and conflict were identified. Interviews were conducted with individuals willing to offer their perspectives on best practices for liaising with the police. The interview themes focused on the protesters' perspectives on what might constitute "good" and "more problematic" approaches. The interviews sought to identify what has gone right in previous protests, what has gone wrong, and what could be done to try to avoid problems in the future. In keeping with the overall goal of the project, the objective of this aspect of the project was to try to incorporate protest group perspectives into police best practices.

All interviews were conducted by the principal investigators and a graduate student researcher. Due to the COVID-19 Pandemic, all interviews were conducted either by phone or via online video conferencing. Participation in the interview was voluntary. Interviews were not audio or video recorded and all information provided by participants was anonymized prior to analysis.

Once the interviews were completed, all of the anonymized information was entered into a Microsoft Word document and qualitatively analyzed for common themes. The analyses focused on themes emerging from the specific content provided by respondents during their interviews, in addition to latent content illustrating any underlying themes.

In total, seven interviews were conducted with individuals identified as key voices within their community from British Columbia.

Quantitative Interviews with Police Executives and Members

As outlined in the methodology section, interviews were conducted with RCMP and municipal police officers of various ranks who have experience with policing protests and liaising with organizations that have engaged in protests. This section will present the main themes that resulted from the interviews with police participants.

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

There was not a single organisational structure designed to address liaising with community organizations or protest groups or directly responding to public protests among the various agencies that participated in interviews for this report. For the RCMP participants, the most common approach was the Division Liaison Team at "E" Division RCMP, which is a national program, and individual detachment members who are connected to the DLT. According to participants, "E" Division RCMP is the only division with a DLT in Canada; however, participants spoke very highly of the DLT approach and structure. Many participants generally felt that they had enough members designated to the DLT, although there were several specific concerns that will be discussed below. Participants also felt that the DLT had properly staffed the necessary leadership roles, sufficient financial resources had been allocated to the DLT, and that there were enough resources to allow members to train others to respond to community conflicts. They further believed that "E" Division's DLT had the necessary experience, skills, and resources to assist other districts that might face protest challenges, if necessary.

It is important to note that being a member of the DLT is not a full-time RCMP position, but a secondary task that officers undertake. Participants reported that there were approximately 85 to 100 DLT members in British Columbia. Of note, participants recognized that there were neither sufficient resources nor enough work to assign members to the DLT as their exclusive or sole assignment, even if doing so would have advantages that will be discussed below. Given the fact that DLT members had other primary duties, when a protest was planned or an event occurred, each RCMP detachment with a DLT member needed to allocate the necessary internal resources and supports so that the officer(s) could be released to work with the DLT. According to several participants, the detachment's release of members to the DLT was critical because, when an event

occurs, the DLT is basically made up of members from various detachments who have been trained to respond to protests. In this way, it is important for members to be willing and able to join the DLT when necessary. So, while participants felt that there were sufficient resources and support for the DLT, its lifeblood was bodies being available, releasable, and willing to serve when needed and requested.

As an example, as mentioned above, participants indicated that there were roughly 85 to 100 members trained for DLT duties. However, from among those members, some would be unavailable if the need arose due to being on holidays, engaged in other training or education programs, or unavailable for some other legitimate reason. From the remaining pool, only a small percentage would respond to an email or phone call request to be released from their current duties to join the DLT for deployment. At that point, members are selected based on their suitability and experience associated with the specific duties required or any cultural concerns that might be part of the protests and are then deployed. Of note, this was not exclusively an RCMP issue. Participants from municipal police departments also reported that officers would not always respond to a request for additional officers to police a protest. The main reasons provided were that there were more lucrative overtime opportunities elsewhere in the department or that officers were not interested in working protests.

More than one participant provided an example from 2020 to demonstrate how this process functioned. In reviewing what participants stated, some of the common comments included that of all DLT members in British Columbia, only a small number typically responded to a request for DLT-trained members to be deployed for an action. Of those, only a small number of members and a team leader are commonly deployed. Members generally come from the specific jurisdiction in which the protest was occurring, but members could also be assigned from various detachments across British Columbia. While this was beneficial in that it increased the size of the response, not necessarily knowing the players or the community was seen as a negative aspect of this model. It was also mentioned that these members still had their regular duties to perform so they might only be deployed at the protest site for a few days and then returned to their detachments to perform their regular duties.

As will be discussed in greater detail below, while DLT members recognized the value of the program and the relationships they developed in the community as DLT members, they were also keenly aware of the challenge of undertaking this kind of work 'off the side of their desks'. Some participants suggested that a benefit of making these positions full-time would be that it might reduce the stress, strain, and burnout of members because they would not be pulled away unexpectedly from their families and would not face the backlog of regular work that awaited them when they returned to their regular duties. Several participants talked about the stress associated with having to fulfill DLT duties on a call-by-call basis, having to leave their primary responsibilities and duties at a moment's notice, regardless of whether one wanted to deploy, and then being deployed for what might be an extended period of time.

Some RCMP participants suggested that the DLT should be considered similarly to community policing, with the same organizational commitment, structure, and full-time members assigned to the work. Still, this might not solve the issue of DLT members being assigned to other

responsibilities when there is a reduction in work or some other emergency, as has occurred with those members assigned to community policing units. Regardless, this is an issue that needs to be addressed as several participants spoke about the increase in DLT deployments in 2020. For example, some participants indicated that they had been on three or more deployments in 2020. Given this, **additional consideration should be given to making some members assigned to the DLT as their primary responsibility**. This issue will be discussed in greater detail below.

While there are differences in how municipal police departments are organized to address the liaison function of the police and their response before, during, and after a protest, many of the same issues reported by the RCMP participants applied to the municipal police department experience. Rather than housing everything under a DLT model, there were different teams, units, or sections in the police department that contributed to the liaison and policing functions as it relates to individual people and groups that engage in protests, such as an operational planning section, a negotiation team, a crowd management unit, Indigenous Liaison Officers, public safety officers, community policing officers, and diversity and inclusion officers. Of note, regardless of the name of the unit or the specific role that one played in the process, two common themes that emerged were the composition of the teams and the workload associated with these duties. For example, as has already been discussed, given that for many of the participants liaison work was a secondary responsibility, but is a critical component of effectively preventing and policing protests, there was simply not enough time and officers to undertake the community liaison function adequately. As a result, establishing and maintaining important and meaningful partnerships, relationships, and interactions with the community, as well as participating and interacting with key stakeholders, were sometimes sidelined in favour of other priorities. Participants argued that this was not the result of their organizations not caring about liaison work, but a result of resource priorities. For example, it was argued that when police leaders needed to allocate finite resources to address gang activities or liaison activities, police leaders commonly concluded that addressing and responding to gang or drug activity was more important than 'property crime'. It was also felt that there were insufficient numbers of Indigenous Community Liaison Officers. Given the amount of work and the number of community agencies that the police could or should be liaising with, it was felt that **more officers, particularly Indigenous Community Liaison Officers, were needed**.

One outcome of this type of structure was that liaison work, especially with those individuals or groups that engage in protests, was diversified throughout the various teams and units within the police agency. In other words, rather than having one or two officers dedicated to liaison work, there might be various officers from a number of units, such as neighbourhood policing officers, public safety officers, general duty officers, diversity liaison officers, who all engage in liaison work. Given this, a key message for officers is "no promises, no surprises". The notion is for all officers to be transparent, engage in outreach, talk to the community, and be tolerant as the foundation for effective liaising with people and groups, especially when it comes to protest liaison outreach, but it is also critical that officers do not make promises that either undermine the work that has already occurred with a particular group or result in a surprise for the group or the police at the event.

Based on the comments of participants, DLT members or Community Liaison Officers (CLO) were either recruited or applied for this position, and that selection was a competitive process that could include an interview. While training will be discussed in greater detail below, demeanor appeared

to be a key characteristic for success. In effect, police agencies were looking for officers who were not heavy-handed and could take some abuse from the public, while still 'keeping their cool'. Given the specific nature of liaison work, a process similar to that used in selecting school liaison officers or community/neighbourhood officers should be employed. Being a DLT member or CLO requires a particular set of communication skills, a great deal of empathy and patience, a willingness to engage with individuals and groups from a non-enforcement perspective, a commitment to cultural sensitivity and diversity, and a commitment to the values of meaningful partnerships, building and maintaining trust, and community policing. While some of these aspects of the position can be taught through education and training, recruitment efforts should be established to identify and target these kinds of officers.

It would appear that regardless of whether the team(s) were from the RCMP or from a municipal police department, it was considered useful to have a single manager who coordinated the efforts of the team leader and those on the ground. The manager should also liaise with the police detachment's or department's senior management to ensure that senior management was informed of the situation on the ground, the activities of the DLT members or CLO, and could allocate the necessary and required resources. In other words, the manager was not seen as being the person on the ground negotiating with the protesters or assigning roles and tasks to the officers at the scene. Instead, the manager was in a position to share their knowledge and experiences with the team leader on the ground, work with senior management to ensure that the person leading the police on the ground was well informed and had the necessary resources to ensure success, coordinate police officers from different police agencies, and make sure that everyone was keenly aware of what the purpose and desired outcome of the deployment was. This suggests the possibility of a model that is distinct, for example, from that envisioned by the relationship between National Security Criminal Investigation Teams (INSET) and Counter-Terrorism Information Officers (CTIO) at the detachment level. Under this model, as part of their responsibilities, assigned and trained individuals at the detachment-level provide information from their jurisdiction to the provincial INSET unit and serve as a liaison between the members in the detachment to INSET. Another approach that the province might consider is an approach more akin to the Integrated Homicide Investigation Team (IHIT), which has a mandate and dedicated members and resources to investigate homicides in RCMP jurisdictions in British Columbia.

At the scene, it is the team leader who is essential. They must know the community, the stakeholders, and the players. It was viewed as critical by participants that this person have previously established a degree of rapport with these different groups, developed a process of communication with stakeholders or leaders, and understand the point of view of those protesting. This included an understanding of the internal dynamics and power relationships within the community and the groups, and who were the necessary people to have relationships with or who are partners. In effect, the Gold, Silver, and Bronze model tended to be viewed by participants as the standard and most effective and efficient model for dealing with a protest. In this way, most participants spoke of the British 'meet and greet' model that encourages and allows the police and the protesters to become familiar with each other and express their concerns to each other. Both sides having a clear understanding of each other's positions was viewed as integral to avoiding

miscalculations or surprises that could result in violence, a breakdown of trust, or an unintended escalation from either side.

TRAINING

Based on the information provided by participants, there is no standard liaison training program for all police officers in British Columbia. Among the RCMP participants, it was reported that all DLT members were trained in community conflict. This included three mandatory courses that must be completed to be a DLT member. Members were required to complete Indigenous cultural sensitivity training and a conflict resolution course that is delivered by the Conflict Management Team (CMT). While this training was designed to address internal organizational conflicts, it contained principles, theories, and tools that were viewed as being applicable to defusing conflict at an individual and community level. The final course was a theory and scenario-based training course that involved members undertaking two to three scenarios with a scenario-based exam focused on role playing. While it was acknowledged that the classroom setting cannot replicate a real situation, the assessment of the participants was that this course provided the basis for the member to apply a variety of principles and theories that could assist them in a dynamic protest or pre-protest environment. RCMP participants suggested that the training allowed officers to build relationships within the community and ensured that DLT members had the necessary will and capacity to undertake DLT duties. It was argued that the training was appropriate, in part, because every DLT officer was at least 30 years old and was a senior police officer suggesting that these members had sufficient police experience to benefit from the training. In other words, experienced police officers were believed to have much more experience with the public and, therefore, in a better position to adapt and see the value in the information and skills being taught. However, none of the participants indicated that there was continual training, upgrading, or recertification related to any of the training courses. **Ensuring that all DLT members were consistently educated and trained on the latest strategies and tactics related to liaison work, cultural sensitively, and conflict de-escalation is important**.

Other RCMP participants spoke about the practical value of the training. For example, some participants outlined how DLT work was extremely labour intensive and occurred, at times, in some very hostile environments. Providing training for officers in how to establish and maintain rapport with people who are hostile to the presence of police officers or who are yelling at the officers was viewed as very important. Participants spoke about how the skills taught in DLT training were helpful beyond their contribution to safely and successfully carrying out their DLT duties. Several members spoke about how the skills they learned in DLT training assisted them in their other 'regular' duties, as it taught them to be more emphatic, to become better listeners, and to focus more on de-escalation tactics and skills. In effect, it was recognized that DLT work required specialized training, that there was a sharp learning curve, and that the situations that DLT members would encounter would likely be very emotionally charged. Given this, participants found the training very helpful and appreciated the focus on teaming a more seasoned DLT member with new DLT members.

There was less consistency among the municipal police officers on the issue of training and being prepared for liaison duties. For example, some participants indicated that there was no specific or distinct training for liaison officers. Instead, new liaison officers would rely on the experience of more veteran officers for information or advice on how to conduct their liaison duties. Given the courses in conflict resolution at institutions like the Justice Institute of BC, this education could be included in the training of municipal liaison officers rather than relying on other officers for this training. However, others mentioned that there was a lot of information provided to them on the position, their role, and what was expected of them. In effect, it did seem to depend on the municipal department as to whether there was dedicated training for the liaison position. For example, one municipal police department provided a one-week course that focused on negotiation training designed to educate liaison officers about the power of the words they used with different stakeholders and community groups. It was suggested that the value of this training was that it taught liaison officers strategies to better communicate, find common ground, and cooperate with individuals and groups. **This type of negotiation training should be provided any anyone assigned to a liaison role, in addition to scenario training**. The recommendation section of this report will include some additional suggestions for training.

Related to the issue of proper preparation, some participants indicated that there was no such thing as a 'typical' protest, which makes training challenging and provides some additional support for ongoing training and re-certification. For example, the strategies deployed for a stationary protest are different from those needed when dealing with a mobile protest. Some units are organized, trained, and designed to address the longer-term, continuous occupations that involve substantial relationship building, while others are more suited to the one-day event that lasts around five hours or less. Moreover, some events are extremely peaceful, others are characterized by pockets of law breaking or violence, while others are violent in nature by design. Some events involve active resistance where people hold on to each other to defy police attempts to remove people, while others are predominately characterised by passive resistance in which protesters 'go limp' requiring the police to carry or drag people away from the scene. Each of these different scenarios and incidents requires different skillsets from officers, tactics and strategies from leaders and frontline officers, and different numbers of officers to maintain the peace. **It is evident that training officers for these various tasks can be extremely complicated, time consuming, and requiring consistent practice, updating, and upgrading**.

It was interesting to note that some participants spoke of having firefighters and medics either embedded with or connected to their officers to respond during a protest. Moreover, these participants indicated that these additional resources were provided with specialized training related to protests that amounted to three days of training every year to qualify for this duty. It was also reported that these resources participated in joint training, which is a very good idea. To that end, whenever possible, **it is recommended that all agencies that provide resources to protests participate in joint training**.

MANDATE AND PURPOSE

Unlike the organisational structure and training, there was much more commonality and consensus about the mandate of the RCMP's DLT and municipal police department's Community Liaison Officers (CLOs). Overwhelmingly, participants spoke about the distinction between the role of a DLT member or a CLO and the role of other police officers. For a DLT member or a CLO, the primary responsibility was to mitigate conflict rather than enforcement. In fact, many spoke of how if the situation on the ground shifted from conversation and liaising to enforcement, other police officers should take the lead to not compromise the role of a DLT member or a CLO. Participants saw their role as ensuring and respecting the public's right to protest peacefully, lawfully, and safely. Rather than enforcement, participants saw their role as fostering dialogue and understanding between the police and those who protest. In effect, DLT members and CLOs saw their roles as engaging with and having a dialogue with protesters and stakeholders. Many participants used the term 'softer approach' to explain their mandate, purpose, and responsibilities.

With the goal of ensuring the peaceful resolution of conflicts, participants spoke about their roles as advocating for the right of those who wish to protest to be able to do so, being proactive with stakeholders and protest groups, and being focused on establishing and maintaining positive conversations with various groups in the community to ensure that protests remained peaceful and lawful while causing as few disruptions to the public as possible. Many participants spoke about how important it was for their roles to be seen by the community and those engaged in protests as not including force or making arrests. It was understood that, in the moment, if violence or property damage was occurring, they would need to act as police officers, but the general intention was to leave police actions to other officers so that a DLT member or a CLO could maintain the trust among the community and protest groups with whom they were working. One simple example of this was traffic disruptions. DLT members and CLOs spoke about how they made a lot of exceptions for traffic disruptions. While people were technically breaking the law, in many circumstances, the DLT members and CLOs allowed this to happen because they recognized the right protest and wanted to ensure that protests were peaceful, so the officers may allow groups to block traffic or may even assist in blocking traffic to allow the protest to proceed peacefully.

SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES

DLT members and CLOs stated that communication and trying to find common ground with community stakeholders or protesters has been a successful strategy. In effect, building a relationship that everyone could rely upon that helped reduce the risk or incident of violence, property damage, or other offences was viewed as a success. It was acknowledged that building meaningful relationships took time and could be negatively affected by DLT members and CLOs being involved in enforcement actions during an event, the reality of having to start over as members/officers changed jobs, or because the member(s) may not be the ultimate decision maker. Still, having a known and trusted DLT member or CLO that can dialogue with a group or community stakeholder routinely was considered a necessary approach for the program to be successful.

It goes without saying that finding a way to allow the protesters an opportunity to express themselves peacefully was also considered a successful approach. Participants stated that they were very aware that stakeholders, individual protesters, and protest groups believed that they were 'in the right' in protesting. Given this, it was extremely important for DLT members and CLOs to, at the very least, find out people's concerns. This did not mean that DLT members and CLOs had to agree with or support the position of the protesters or to even sympathise with them. Instead, establishing an open dialogue with protesters and building a trusting relationship was seen as being a critical strategy. This can be achieved by simply listening to the group's concerns and answering their questions in a timely fashion. Participants recognized that solving the issue was not their role, nor was traditional police information or intelligence gathering. Instead, participants saw their role as providing people with an opportunity to be heard and to express themselves in a safe way. Creating an environment where this could occur was seen as a successful strategy.

Participants believed that one of the most successful ways of achieving this aforementioned goal was to have an agreement in place between the police and protesters about what the protesters would be doing, where they would be going, how long they would be protesting, and how the police would react. According to some participants, this strategy has allowed DLT members and CLOs to influence the behaviour of protesters in some situations, minimized the negative effects that some protests and protesters can have on traffic, public access to certain areas, and public safety, and reduced the police footprint at certain events, which may have contributed to escalating potential opportunities for violence or mischief. Moreover, achieving and abiding by these kinds of agreements was seen as a way of building trust between the protesters and DLT members and CLOs, as well as building additional trust and confidence between the DLT members and CLOs and their respective police organizations. Another benefit of these agreements was that it assisted the police in developing deployment scenarios. In other words, having agreements in place and establishing trust that these agreements would be abided by allowed the police to better plan how many officers will be needed before, during, and after the protest, and what type of officers and equipment should be deployed.

Given what participants mentioned were successful strategies, it was not surprising that all participants frequently returned to the theme of communication as the most important strategy. In addition to the role that open communication had in the establishment of an agreement, participants often cited miscommunication or the breakdown of lines of communication as the key contributing element when the work of DLT members and CLOs was unsuccessful. It was also noteworthy that participants indicated that it was much more common than not for protesters or protest groups to be willing to engage with DLT members and CLOs in meaningful dialogue. In this way, a successful strategy was bringing the right people on all sides together at the right time to ensure that, if a protest or event was to occur, it would be done in such a way that allowed the protesters to have their say, while allowing the police to maintain the peace and public safety.

While being able to enter into a mutually beneficial agreement prior to an event was viewed as a successful strategy overall and an effective way of reducing the chances of an event becoming violent, it was also acknowledged that this approach failed when there was a lack of trust between the protesters and the police. In situations where the two parties were not able to establish agreed upon boundaries or there was a general lack of trust, productive lines of communication could be

interrupted or broken that increased the risk of an incident. In effect, participants generally reported that not being able to have an agreement in place outlining when, where, and for how long a protest was going to occur was a failure, even though it was acknowledged that reaching an agreement was simply not always possible.

It was also reported by participants that it was not only critical for DLT members or CLOs to successfully negotiate with the protesters before an event but to also have the support of the senior management of the police department or detachment about what was going to happen and the agreed upon police response. This included having the necessary people and equipment on the ground for the event and an understanding among the police officers about their role and responsibilities during an event. As an example, one participant spoke about a specific protest in which there was an agreement in place between the group and the DLT members or CLOs about what the protesters were going to do. There was also an agreement between the DLT members or CLOs and their police organization allowing the protesters to engage in a particular behaviour. However, during the event, some police officers began to arrest protesters for engaging in the agreement upon behaviour. Emotions began to run high, and the situation quickly escalated. The participant felt that the root cause of this incident was not the behaviour of the protesters but that the police officers at the scene were not properly briefed.

Some participants also suggested that it was not worthwhile to try to engage with protesters during an event. In other words, in the absence of an agreement or a dialogue with a group prior to an event, it was not seen as effective or useful to try to negotiate with the protesters during an event, for example during a march. Participants felt that DLT members or CLOs should not be deployed at that point. Instead, other police officers should be deployed to maintain the peace and to enforce the law; this was not perceived as the appropriate time for DLT members or CLOs to attempt to engage with the protesters. Of note, this is not to suggest that there is no role for DLT members or CLOs at the beginning of an event. It is possible for DLT members or CLOs to engage with protest leaders at the beginning and to have other police officers a few blocks away; however, as it becomes clear that the protest will continue without any agreement or dialogue between the police and the protesters, it was seen as more useful for the DLT members or CLOs to withdraw and be replaced with other police officers.

Still, other participants felt that there was some value in engaging with protesters during an event. While participants spoke of how their unit or team gathered information and intelligence from open and close sources about people and events that were about to take place or were planned for the future, participants also stated that they were aware of the overwhelming majority of events before they occurred, that the vast majority of events were peaceful, and, given this, much of the interaction with protesters could occur successfully either just before or at the event. For example, because most of the time the police have little to no concerns with the people or groups that are protesting, the police can simply talk to the protesters during an event to ensure that they are safe, are able to protest peacefully, and that there is minimal disruption to the public. It is in these situations that some participants felt that DLT members and CLOs could be effective in building some trust between the police and the protesters, especially when the protest does not have an anti-police orientation.

Of course, there are events in which the goal of protesters is to be arrested, preferably in front of the media or are interested in a confrontation with the police or counter-protesters. As discussed above, it was also viewed as counter-productive, with longer-term negative ramifications, to have DLT members or CLOs involved in enforcement actions. It was viewed by participants that DLT members or CLOs should be involved in communication and negotiations, but once it becomes necessary for the police to engage in enforcement activities, that other officers take on this responsibility. The notion was that all the goodwill that DLT members or CLOs developed over time with the protesters could be destroyed in just a few seconds of them participating in enforcement actions. Participants were not suggesting that the police not enforce the law during protests or ensure that protesters abided by the good faith agreements that have been negotiated. Rather, participants were concerned that having DLT members or CLOs involved in enforcement activities would make it impossible for them to serve effectively as DLT members or CLOs with those groups or the community moving forward.

A final unsuccessful strategy was for the person(s) negotiating with the protesters on behalf of the police to not be a decision-maker or someone who had the authority to make an agreement. As mentioned throughout this report, one of the key elements of a successful DLT member or CLO is the ability to connect, communicate, and work with community stakeholders, protest group leaders, and protesters. This role is somewhat undermined if the DLT member or CLO does not have the ability or authority to speak on behalf of or commit the police organization to a course of action or to make an agreement with the protesters. While it was recognized that this was not always possible, it was viewed as detrimental to the process to have DLT members or CLOs negotiate with protesters only to have these negotiations undermined by someone else in the organization who is required to approve the agreement. In effect, many participants argued that it was critical to have the right person involved from the beginning of the process who could establish expectations and who is the decision maker. Similarly, it is important to understand who lacks the authority to commit either the police organization or the protest group to an agreement. One way to resolve this issue might be to have routine dialogue between the DLT members or CLOs and their senior officers to ensure that they are well briefed on the position of the police agency. While it is understandable that it would be very unlikely for a police agency to allow their DLT members or CLOs to commit the police to a particular course of action, it is important to avoid undermining the good will, understandings, or the relationships that have been established between the community and the DLT members or CLOs.

PARTNERSHIPS

Unlike other units or teams within a police agency, it did not appear that DLT members or CLOs from different jurisdictions had a common set of partnerships. Instead, formal and informal partnerships were very jurisdictionally dependent. Some participants spoke of the value of their partnerships with Indigenous groups and environmental groups, while others spoke of the importance of their relationships with local governments and the business community. Even in jurisdictions in which participants indicated that they did not have formal partnerships with protest groups, it was commonly stated that they were aware of who the main protesters and

protest groups were, and that these individuals or groups would often reach out to the police to notify the police of their intentions and where they would be protesting ahead of an event so that the police could be prepared to assist with things like traffic and crowd control. Regardless, there were several common themes related to the value and nature of the partnerships that DLT members or CLOs have established.

As expected, the first main theme was the importance of open communication between partners. It was interesting to note that participants felt that even if the discussions or dialogues they had with protesters, stakeholder groups, or the community were not positive, they could still function as a foundation to build trust and respect between DLT members or CLOs and partners. It was also believed that it was very important to build trusting relationships by being as transparent as possible. One participant stated that whenever they were asked about police policies, for example with respect to civil disobedience, DLT members or CLOs should always provide the requested information. Again, answering questions, providing information, and keeping the lines of communication open increased a sense of trust and that the police were genuinely committed to the partnership. Participants also spoke of their partnerships with other police organizations. These partnerships were based on information sharing about groups or individuals, joint deployment, and models for establishing DLTs or CLO units. For example, some participants spoke of weekly calls to discuss ingoing protests in a jurisdiction. Given this, if not already in place, **there should be formal agreements in place between the RCMP, the municipal police departments, and other agencies of public safety, such as the Metro Vancouver Transit Police, to conduct joint training, share strategies, tactics, promising practices, and information**. Regional meetings could be held quarterly for this purpose.

IDENTIFIED CHALLENGES WITH THE ROLE OF DLT MEMBERS AND CLOs

Most participants spoke of the challenges posed by the dual role DLT members or CLOs. On the one hand, DLT members and CLOs spent a lot of their time developing relationships and rapport with community stakeholders. They were tasked with building trust and lines of communication between stakeholders and the police. As mentioned above, DLT members and CLOs must work in the community and be seen as honest brokers. However, these officers are also police officers with a range of responsibilities and powers, including the power of arrest and the use of force. The challenge that many participants spoke of was when DLT members and CLOs needed to exercise their responsibilities as police officers. As mentioned above, this can irreparably damage the relationship between the community and DLT members and CLOs making it impossible to continue with their role as a DLT members and CLOs in that community. Participants stressed that it was very important to remember that the role of a DLT members and CLOs was a highly politicized position. Regardless of one's intentions or skills, participants indicated that if you wore a police officer uniform, you represented the government, the police, and, in the minds of some, the enemy. For some members of the public, the uniform can be a negative trigger. One of the ways to address this concern, in part, was for **DLT members and CLOs to have a different uniform that was much more casual or dress in plain clothes**, including polo shirts. Not only could this serve to humanize the DLT members and CLOs, but it could also better distinguish these officers and their

roles from that of other police officers. Moreover, because DLT members were not necessarily from the community where the protest or conflict was occurring, they may not be the general duty members that the public or stakeholders more routinely encountered or interacted with. In effect, DLT members are separate or distinct from other officers, which may be a benefit in maintaining trust and dialogue, even when tensions heightened between stakeholders, members of the public, and the police.

Another challenge was recognizing the differences between the public and private faces of protests and protesters, and how these differences affected the role of DLT members and CLOs. Participants acknowledged that they must have different strategies for when the events were on camera and when they were in private. When in public, DLT members and CLOs indicated that they were often portrayed by protesters as the enemy, as creating conflict, and as targets for verbal and physical attacks, especially when the media was present. However, DLT members and CLOs also stated that behind the scenes, there was rarely conflict. Given this, it was felt that positioning DLT members and CLOs behind the scenes, frequently before public events occur, was critical because it allowed for rapport building and for productive conversations to occur that could reduce the risk for violence and increase the likelihood of maintaining a peaceful protest. Participants also stated that it was important for DLT members and CLOs to not engage in public debate in front of the cameras because this was what many protesters wanted. Protesters wanted confrontation or the police to engage in enforcement actions in the public so that the media would report negatively on the police's actions and the public could empathize with the protestors. In other words, in addition to doing the right things, it was important for the police to be *seen* to be doing the right thing.

DLT members and CLOs also recognised that there were direct action protesters whose primary purpose was to engage in unlawful protesting or to create conflict with the police that could reported by the media. Participants acknowledged the importance of not playing into the hands of this kind of protesters and spoke to the importance of training and a clear chain of command to avoid falling into that kind of situation. In effect, the police participants in this study provided several examples where, in public, groups wanted confrontation with the police, especially when the media was present, but, in private, meaningful and production conversations between these groups and DLT members and CLOs were occurring. So, while there were instances where the process did not work very well, such as the protests in Smithers, in other situations, identifying the parties or stakeholders, connecting with them, using DLT members and CLOs, and having situational reports was viewed as being effective. Related to this point, there are times in protests where the police are required to arrest a few people in the crowd who are causing trouble or engaging in violence or property damage. While not necessarily the role of DLT members and CLOs, it is important that police continually speak to the crowd to inform them of what the police are doing, why they are taking whatever actions they are taking, and how the crowd can avoid a police enforcement response.

It was interesting to note that participants understood that when it came to big direct-action protests in which conflict was the purpose, it was important to not involve DLT members and CLOs to ensure that these officers were not compromised by engaging in enforcement actions that would make it difficult for them to do liaison work in the future. Again, participants felt that the role of DLT members and CLOs was best served by them not engaging in enforcement activities whenever

possible as this damaged their ability to build trust, rapport, and meaningful dialogue. Participants viewed their role as establishing an avenue for productive and meaningful conversation and dialogue; however, this was extremely difficult to do with people or groups interested in conflict or who wanted to debate the police in front of the camera rather than engage in meaningful dialogue.

In sum, participants felt that when a situation involved direct-action protesters, the purpose of the event was usually about conflict. In these cases, enforcement is needed, not DLT members and CLOs. As an example, during the 2011 Stanley Cup Riots in Vancouver, when people were throwing Molotov cocktails, people were not interested in engaging with the police in dialogue. As such, it would not have been effective or prudent to use DLT members and CLOs in this situation. The effectiveness of DLT members and CLOs is in their ability to think strategically, rather than strategic operations. The DLT and CLO program is built on engaging in conversation and building mutual trust and respect. Given this, from the perspective of participants, conflict liaison communication was viewed as not being very productive or effective during a riot. Instead, this approach was viewed as being much better suited to preventing a riot in the first instance.

It was felt that most people who wanted to protest were ordinary people who were not interested in conflict or in being arrested. Most protesters were there to say their piece and were willing to work with the police to ensure that they could protest peacefully for a specified amount of time. In part, participants expressed frustration that the media often did not report on all these types of situations; the ones that were negotiated successfully and resulted in a peaceful protest. Instead, the view of participants was that the media tended to focus on direct-action protests or the conflict-based events, which made the overall job and acceptance of DLT members and CLOs more difficult. Contributing to this challenge was the belief that the public does not make any distinctions between regular police and DLT members and CLOs, in terms of their roles and mandate.

Another challenge expressed by participants was related to the need for human resources and how to best manage these resources. As mentioned above, it was commonly felt that more trained members were needed, especially having members dedicated to the DLT and CLO role, rather than doing this work as an aside to their regular duties. One specific need mentioned particularly by the RCMP participants was for a dedicated coordinator to organize and supervise all DLT members. The coordinator position could be used to ensure that members were doing well, were up to date with their training, that the latest training techniques were being used, and could deliver timely feedback to members about their performance in the field. However, participants recognized that it would be challenging to convince the government to pay for permanent, dedicated, and full-time DLT members when the officers were only activated and deployed a few times per year. In effect, while participants saw the benefits of dedicated full-time members, they understood the challenges in creating these positions based on a return-on-investment calculation.

The fact that there are not dedicated members was seen as directly contributing to the challenge of retention. There is a cost in time and resources to train DLT members and CLOs; however, because of promotion, other specialized unit opportunities, or officer lifestyle changes, DLT members and CLOs typically did not remain active for very long. Not only is the job very challenging, but it is also unpredictable, and does not promote a sense of comradery among officers that other units do, at least within the RCMP DLT model as these officers do not come together very often and are part of

detachments that are spread across British Columbia. As indicated above, the lack of a dedicated coordinator position also makes it difficult to identify who is performing well in the job and who might be struggling. In effect, participants felt that without a fully supported program like other community policing units, it was unlikely that many of the elements that make other specialized units successful would be present in the DLT program or among DLT officers. Again, while this was recognized as a significant challenge, it was also understood that members might only be activated for six events or several weeks throughout the year, therefore, participants understood the challenge or hesitation on the part of the RCMP to establish a permanent unit. Still, it is a challenge to establish a unit in the way that other 'support' units function but with the requirement to deploy to the field in some extremely volatile situations.

Another related issue was the ability to get the "right kind" of police officers to become DLT members and CLOs. This was also recognized as being very challenging because of the erratic schedule, the need to leave other responsibilities when deployed, and the labour-intensive nature of the work. While many police officers are used to people screaming at them, DLT and community liaison work is not easy. Rather than responding to calls for service, DLT and community liaison work requires officers to engage with people and foster relationships. In this way, participants felt that DLT members and CLOs, as mentioned above, needed to be excellent communicators, possess a more flexible personality rather than a rigid police mentality, and needed to be more empathic, respectful, and less forceful in trying to resolve conflicts. Participants stressed the importance in understanding that the DLT members and CLOs were not the arbiters of right and wrong and not there primarily to enforce the law. Instead, the job required officers who were interested in learning about Indigenous issues or environmental issues, in fostering positive dialogue, and engaging with various groups, stakeholders, and people. While it was recognized by participants that training could assist with the development of some of these traits and knowledge, such as negotiation skills, active listening, de-escalation, the history of Indigenous people and law enforcement, there was also the belief that an ability to think laterally about issues, an ability to not see themselves as the authority or arbiter in the situation, having a sense of humility, and a commitment to the value of liaising, relationship building, and partnerships were critical for DLT members and CLOs.

Stemming from the issue of not having full-time members, there was a concern expressed by several participants that DLT members and CLOs were essentially reactive rather than proactive. It was felt that there were many situations that could be resolved amicably by DLT members and CLOs if they were imbedded in and engaged with communities and stakeholders, rather than being called out once an incident or event is about to take place or has already occurred. Within the RCMP model, participants indicated that it was more common for a bronze commander to request the deployment of a DLT for a particular event. In this way, it was felt that the DLTs were more reactive than proactive. For example, with respect to some protest events involving Indigenous peoples, one participant indicated that Indigenous Policing Services (IPS) members engaged very proactively with the community. These officers understood their community and fostered positive and trusting relationships between the RCMP and the community. In this way, the proactive component of liaison work was performed by the IPS members and the DLT members used these relationships as a launching off point to begin dialogue once they were activated. While not wishing to interfere

with the work undertaken by the IPS officers, participants felt that having dedicated members would allow them to participate with and create their own community relationships and partnerships in jurisdictions that either had a history of protests or were viewed as likely to have protests, without relying on the relationships established by IPS officers.

Of course, there are instances where the police are aware of a pending court decision that might result in the need for DLT members and CLOs to deploy to the affected communities. In these instances, DLT members and CLOs have been proactive in establishing relationships and partnerships based on what might happen once a judicial decision is reached. Moreover, DLT members and CLOs often maintained relationships and communication with various groups by attending or participating in organisation or community meetings or forums. As an example, DLT members and CLOs may participant in Indigenous Council meetings or with other community-based or non-governmental organisations, which can be viewed as proactive work designed to establish relationships, trust, and understanding between the various parties. Participation in these types of events can also increase the knowledge that police have about the key players, the concerns that people have, and provide an opportunity to the police to facilitate dialogue between various parties ahead of a confrontation.

Interviews with Community and Organisation Members

Interviews were completed with individuals representing various communities and programs. Based on their experiences liaising with the police, several themes emerged pertaining to the liaison process and how it may be improved. The first two themes centered on the current state of the relationship between the police and various communities. The remaining themes addressed areas where the liaison process may be improved from the perspective of these communities.

Of note, although the focus of this study was police liaison efforts in the context of protests, the authors were unable, despite their best efforts, to secure interviews with leaders of protest groups. As a result, the authors chose instead, to reach out to various community groups and organizations. Although these interviews did not directly focus on liaising with police in relation to protests, the information provided by these community members provided valuable insights into guiding the development of good practices for the police to improve their police-citizen encounters more generally, as well as their practices for addressing protest situations more specifically. Police work involves the same tasks and responsibilities; thus, whether police are interacting with citizens in a one-on-one situation, or as a group during a public gathering, police encounters with the public and engagement with communities should all follow the same principles. Best practices for police should be informed by experiences from all types of interactions, ranging from the routine/daily activities to the rarer incidents, and be inclusive of the positive and negative outcomes.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE AND INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES
HISTORICAL AND ONGOING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES

Community participants pointed to the need for police to address the historical barriers that have led to many of the issues facing Indigenous communities today. Referencing the development of the

legal system, participants pointed out the difficulties associated with the foundations of the Canadian legal system, particularly the notion that laws were not designed to address the unique needs of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous people did not write these laws; rather, the laws were forced upon them. Indigenous peoples had their own laws, but they were not written down. So, colonizers wrote their own laws that did not and do not reflect Indigenous cultures, laws, or worldviews.

Because the laws were never designed to protect Indigenous ways of life, the system created a situation wherein Indigenous peoples were at odds with law enforcement. Through the establishment of land cession treaties in the 1870s, Indigenous peoples were to be integrated as British subjects into the colonial state. From the beginning, the police were utilized to facilitate the subjugation of Indigenous peoples to colonial law through the suppression of their independence as sovereign peoples, and to aid in the process of land acquisition and settlement to establish agricultural and early industrial capitalist economies (Nettelbeck & Smandych, 2010). Given their magisterial powers, police were afforded the capacity to carry out their duties with "benevolent despotism", which was believed to provide the foundation for the mistreatment of Indigenous peoples at the hands of the police (Nettelbeck & Smandych, 2010, p. 361).

Several participants noted that the historical context has laid the foundation for the existing tensions between the police and Indigenous communities. They explained that some of the behaviours of the police, both past and present, foster a great deal of mistrust towards the police within Indigenous communities. In various interviews, events such as residential schools, missing and murdered Indigenous women, and the mistreatment of Indigenous persons in particular settings and neighbourhoods were commonly mentioned.

Many participants were quick to acknowledge that some police agencies had made improvements in terms of their handling of Indigenous peoples and issues, but they also indicated that much work remains to be done. In some communities, mistrust between members and the police are rooted in deep mistrust. Some participants expressed skepticism that trust could be established. In one telling instance, a participant noted that police officers who had been charged with inappropriate use of force against an Indigenous person was still deployed in the community. This sends a very specific message to the Indigenous community, one that is very difficult to overcome, and limits the trust that some people have in the liaison process with the police.

Many participants shared personal stories of "run-ins" with the police, highlighting the fact that the mistrust of the police was grounded in their day-to-day experiences. Participants spoke of growing up experiencing racism from the police. One participant mentioned that it had taken most of their life, but that they were almost at a place where they did not suffer from anxiety when they saw a police officer. Interestingly, she credited much of that improvement to the work of a single police officer who worked in a liaison capacity and had **"put in the work" over a considerable period of time to establish a level of trust**. The role of individual officers within police agencies will be examined more fully below. As the same time, this participant pointed to the fragility of this trust and commented on the importance of the actions and/or inactions of the police in terms of their bolstering and/or undermining the efforts made thus far by the police to mend the relationship between the police and Indigenous peoples. Importantly, they said that they no longer saw the

police "beating people up all the time." Still, they continued to feel profiled by the police. They expressed ongoing fears and frustrations over police inaction surrounding missing and murdered Indigenous women. They also detailed how certain police policies and practices served to undermine trust. Among the more common examples of problematic practices were "street sweeps". Trust between the police and the community is also damaged when the police trivialize or ignore community members and their concerns. Participants related incidents where they tried to ask for help, or even report an ongoing crime to a police officer, only to be completely ignored. Despite the best intentions of some police programs aimed at increased contact with communities, and the best efforts of individual officers to make this communication work, incidents such as these damage trust building efforts. This lack of trust directly contributed to increasing the challenge in establishing the type of relationships needed to make liaison efforts between the police and certain protest groups effective, meaningful, and routine.

ALIGN POLICE POLICIES AND PRACTICES WITH THE NEEDS AND CONCERNS OF INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES

A second theme expressed by participants related to concerns about a perceived disconnect between the current foci and orientations in policing and the needs and concerns of members from the Indigenous communities. The participants pointed to the pressing need for police practices to be reflective of the realities of policing Indigenous communities. Participants noted what they referred to as the "But what can we do today?" approach. That is, police agencies are seen as not being interested in the broader historical grievances, nor the larger issues affecting communities. Rather, they are perceived as being more interested in showing that they are addressing particular concerns, such as improving community-police relations. Indigenous communities, in contrast, want to have more say in policing, with some wanting the police to address the bigger issues and those that are having the greatest negative effects on Indigenous communities. For example, some participants expressed a desire to delve into and address systemic issues, such as education, health, and law. Moreover, they wanted the police to be part of those conversations.

These sentiments lead into broader arguments being made to push for reforms to policing in Canada. Two of the primary pillars driving the proposed modernization of the British Columbia *Police Act* is the need to address systemic issues, including racism, and ensure policing is aligned with the tenets of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, n.d.). Similar initiatives are taking place in Toronto. Following the publication of a city report identifying systemic racism as a pervasive issue within the Toronto police force, the Toronto Mayor, John Tory, proposed to implement a number of "sweeping" reforms to the police force, including the creation of non-police alternatives for communities, and anti-racism training to address the discrimination of marginalised communities by the police (Bowden, 2020).

Recognizing that reconsidering the foundations of federal and provincial systems, including the criminal justice system, is particularly difficult, participants also suggested several approaches for improving police policies and practices to better address the needs of Indigenous communities. One example that was routinely cited was the need for trauma-informed policing. There was a widely

held belief that trauma-informed policing is central for beginning to repair some of the previous harms experienced by Indigenous communities. There was an acknowledgement that some police agencies talked about adopting trauma-informed practices, but that progress toward this goal was uneven. And, as noted previously, every time the police behave in a manner that is inconsistent with trauma-informed practices, trust in the institution more generally unravels. Given this, one way to enhance the role of DLT members and CLOs would be **to include trauma-informed policing practices into their training and to ensure that liaison activities take this approach when establishing relationships and partnerships with Indigenous groups**.

Incorporating cultural sensitivity and awareness into policing may help to address historical wrongs moving forward. Some participants suggested that concerns of potential systemic racism in policing could be rectified, at least in part, by police training, especially to the degree that such training highlighted awareness around racism and the challenges related to incidents of racism. Participants noted that officers needed targeted training designed to enhance their understanding of diversity and the power dynamics between the police and Indigenous communities. This type of training was seen as necessary for all police officers but was particularly important for those engaged in liaison work with Indigenous communities and groups. Participants pointed out that community diversity was accelerating, and that police agencies needed to look inward to ensure that the police were both inclusive and prioritized inclusivity. It was generally felt that this moment in time represented an important opportunity for policing; specifically, it provides the **opportunity to demonstrate cultural responsiveness**.

THE LIAISON PROCESS CAN BE BENEFICIAL FOR THE POLICE AND COMMUNITIES

It is important to recognize that, while participants had particular concerns about policing, most also explicitly identified benefits that could come out of positive relationships between the police and the community. These potential benefits were perceived as flowing both ways in that both the community and the police stood to gain from improved relations. For instance, participants suggested that the liaison process could be extremely informative for members of the community. Because of their histories of mistrust of the police, some community members felt an acute sense of frustration. But efforts at outreach could begin to mitigate these feelings. One participant suggested that these efforts could be as simple as contact, communication, and interaction. They talked about particular liaison officers who attended and, more importantly, actively participated in, community events. They also spoke in positive terms about initiatives aimed at educating individuals about safety awareness, and more generally about efforts to inform that community what the police were doing, what were some of the issues from the police's perspective, and what approaches the police were taking to address critical issues. In effect, rather than requiring people to come to the police station, which many people were unwilling to do, efforts such as coming into community settings to interact with people who experienced a criminal event, including doing interviews and taking statements, were greatly appreciated. A wide variety of other examples of activities that increased community receptivity were mentioned, including participating in welcome orientations for newcomers and their families to the Vancouver or Canada on a continuous basis, dropping in on adult English language classes and youth programming, touching base with multicultural youth, the citizen academy program, partnering with community groups around special events, such as

International Women's Day, and participating in self-defence classes for newcomer women. Several interviews mentioned the fact that a community group had once hosted a Police Board meeting; this meeting provide the opportunity for the Board and senior officers to interact with community members and was regarded as an "invaluable educational opportunity". It was also perceived that participating in the community in these ways contributed to the work of the DLTs and the CLOs as they would become more known to the community, more trusted by community members, and not exclusively viewed through the lens of police enforcement.

Participants also suggested that the liaison process provided police and communities with the opportunity to generate greater levels of understanding and healing by creating a safe space for fostering important and necessary discussions. Though this sometimes involved difficult discussions, participants indicated that this was a tangible benefit of the liaison approach. One participant expressed that sentiment in this way: "With the history of colonization, much healing is needed. We need to maintain the conversation about fear of law enforcement, or the hate toward law enforcement. Sometimes this is from a [bad] personal experience with law enforcement, sometimes it historical, or what we have heard from others in the community or stereotypes etc. This all shapes our reactions. But liaison efforts have been part of a healing process for our community." Another participant commented that despite important differences, the community and the police did, in fact, share some common space and the goal of community safety, and that this commonality could serve as the basis of relationship-building moving forward.

By transforming the dynamics between police and the community, the liaison process could serve to create an opening to break down barriers and address important challenges. Some participants were part of bringing the police into collaborations. They spoke about walking officers through buildings to introduce them to specific people in attempts to create safe spaces. At the same time, police officers were able to observe and understanding what the community or organization was trying to achieve. These efforts certainly present challenges but it was viewed by participants as an important aspect of helping the police understanding the broader context and to develop an atmosphere of collective success, regardless of what the particular issue was. From the perspective of participants, it was critical for DLT members or CLOs to understand the context and point of view of the organizations and the individuals associated with these groups, and to try and create an atmosphere of collective success. More generally, positive interactions with the police in these safe, controlled settings allows community members to learn about the police before they have an interaction with them on the street and begins the process of building trust and a meaningful relationship that can assist in achieving the objectives of both those engaged in protests and the DLT members or CLOs.

A SUCCESSFUL LIAISON PROCESS IS CENTERED ON TRUST

Because of the actual and potential benefits of the liaison process, participants understood the importance of building and maintaining a positive relationship between police and the community. They emphasized that the relationship must survive and noted that the community and the police needed to maintain the relationship to address larger and more systemic issues that form the basis of many protests and protest groups. Participants consistently indicated that the foundation for

building and sustaining successful relationships between the police and various communities hinged upon developing and maintaining trust. According to participants, **successful liaison efforts require that officers earn trust over time by demonstrating their commitment to their communities**. One of the challenges identified by participants was that the abilities of the community to build trust is often contingent on the specific individual officer. Some officers were recognized as being particularly sympathetic to the community and being more willing to directly engage with the community. In contrast, other officers appeared, at least to participants, to be less interested in these trust building efforts. Given this, as indicated above, **the selection of DLT members and CLOs is critical to the success** of these efforts.

IMPROVING THE LIAISON PROCESS

Although participants spoke of the benefits of liaising with police, as well as their desire to continue to engage with the process, there was consensus that much work remained to be done to build positive relations between the police and members of the Indigenous communities. Participants pointed to several mechanisms by which the liaison process could be improved moving forward.

THE LIAISON PROCESS REQUIRES POLICE SUPPORT AND SUFFICIENT RESOURCE ALLOCATION

At the organizational level, police agencies must be invested in the liaison process. An important facet of this investment is the dedication of sufficient resources to ensure that community needs are being met. Participants were keenly aware that this is a "tug of war" around resource allocation, and that those programs and initiatives that did not have a commitment from the highest levels of the police agencies were likely to have difficulties securing resources. Simply put, the process of resource allocation was perceived as an indication of the value placed on the program by the police; underfunded programs were deemed to be less important and less worthwhile. Thus, if sufficient resources were not invested in community outreach and liaison initiatives, this sent a message to the community that developing and maintaining these efforts was not a high priority for the police.

Although participants acknowledged that the police were making strides in terms of their commitment to liaising with community members, the consensus was that for real progress to be made the police needed to allocate more of their resources and time to this process. At the most fundamental, community relations were regarded as understaffed in that there were simply not officers dedicated to community relations, and those who were available were forced to divide their time between liaison activities and other responsibilities and duties. Some participants noted a desire for greater engagement at the community level, but that those desires could not be met the existing structure of outreach efforts. Participants noted that an increase in resources would be essential as communities and police moved forward with the liaison process. Some participants mentioned specific officers who seemed to want to be more engaged, but who simply did not have the time. Not only does building a meaningful and trusted relationship between police officers and community members take time, addressing the deep-rooted issues between the police and Indigenous peoples or certain other groups requires sustained effort and manpower. As one

participant commented, the mistrust between some communities and the police was very deeply rooted. This mistrust cannot be overcome quickly or through superficial efforts. Rather, repairing relations or building new ones will take genuine, sustained effort on the part of the police.

DESIRE TO IMPROVE OFFICER FLEXIBILITY AND RESPONSIVENESS

Linked directly to the issues related to staffing and resource allocation, several participants agreed that deficiencies in officer flexibility and responsiveness hindered the liaison process. In particular, community members would like for officers to be available and present more so that the community can engage with them more often. Participants expressed concern that too many officers were inflexible in their involvement with community members and groups. For example, officers often demanded that their engagement or participation be scheduled in advance. For the community, this presented some challenges. Participants suggested that if there were more officers for community liaising, and if those officers had more available time, those officers could be more firmly entrenched in the communities and their involvement could be more informal.

Related to this issue, participants noted that the liaison process benefited when officers took a more proactive approach when engaging with communities. For some participants, this meant being more self-directed, engaging, not waiting around for work to be assigned, dropping by community locations, and taking the initiative in working with individuals, groups, and organizations. Of note, participants acknowledged the limitations imposed by policing organizations on their officers, the priority that police placed on liaison efforts, and that having officers more available and engaged with the community required a shift in how most police organizations allocated their staffing resources. Participants understood that proactive policing in the area of liaison would require more personnel. But several noted that the transition to more proactive efforts was critical to establishing and maintaining positive relationships with the community. Simply put, for many communities, having DLTs or CLOs who were primarily reactive in their liaison work was not viewed positively or beneficial to the goals of police liaison work.

In addition to transitioning to a more proactive orientation, participants suggested that the liaison process would be improved if DLT members or CLOs were more engaged with the particular needs of the communities. Specifically, participants hoped to see police become more responsive to calls for service from Indigenous and other identifiable communities as a first step to improving the liaison process. Connected to this issue was participants' concerns relating to officer follow-up. According to participants, a lack of follow-up from officers with community members reduced critical information sharing, left community members vulnerable to future harmful behaviours, and suggested to the community that the police did not care about their concerns nor were the police a genuine partner in trying to address the concerns of the community. This was particularly true in relation to vulnerable women. Ultimately, the lack of or insufficient police engagement in follow-up served to undermine the important efforts police have made towards building trusting relationships with Indigenous peoples. While this engagement may not be directly related to the liaison process as it relates to protests and protest groups, participants felt that there was a more direct relationship. In effect, if the police could not be trusted to address more common crime-related calls for service, there was little expectation that the police would be a reliable partner in

larger issues or those that might result in protests. Moreover, most participants expressed frustration at the lack of follow-up in relation to their cases, and each indicated that they were further traumatized by their perceptions of their interactions with the police, thus reducing the likelihood of a trusting and collaborative partnership with the police on more systemic issues involving, for example, racial discrimination, environmental concerns, and criminal justice reform.

THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND COMMUNITIES

From the perspective of the community participants, building a sustainable relationship between police and communities requires more than merely increasing the level of police support for the process. According to participants, to further the development of the liaison process, **the relationship between the police and the community needed to move away from being police-driven towards more of a partnership between the parties**. To many communities, the way the police agencies envisioned and carried out engagement efforts was simply a further extension of a very problematic and imbalanced hierarchical power structure. Too many initiatives came across as a police operation. In effect, the concern was that the police scheduled the meetings, as well as chaired the meetings. Perhaps more importantly, the police imposed the agenda without seeking input from the community. Participants spoke of the frustration they experienced by having the police deciding what would be the topics of discussion at meetings. Very often, the issues that the police wanted to talk about were not the same as the things that the community wanted to discuss. From the perspective of participants, this had the effect of limiting and restricting the conversation and, at times, making these meetings less valuable for the community. In contrast, numerous participants argued that **the formal interactions should be based more on shared authority**. For example, meetings should feature co-chairs from the community to enhance community representation and, as a result, legitimacy. Also helpful would be a system that solicited community input and allowed for the identification of joint priorities. Together, these structural improvements and efforts at power sharing would also help establish trust and further the liaison process.

A related issue pertained to the timing of police-community meetings. Participants noted that, in many cases, meetings with the police were ad hoc. As an alternative option, participants favored a more consistent process. They argued that the ad hoc system served to perpetuate power imbalances; that is, it allowed the police to keep control of the discussions. In contrast, participants felt that more routine meetings would be more conducive to building better relationships and partnerships.

By actively collaborating with members from various communities, the police may also increase the effectiveness of their responses to particular situations, and, thus, improve outcomes. Discussing protests specifically, one participant explained how it was advantageous for police to seek and obtain input from community members prior to the start of the event. The participant commented that it would be much more effective to have discussions with the police prior to a protest. However, this participant stated that it was more common for the police to come to the groups after the fact to inquire about what the police could have done better. While it is noteworthy that the police, in these cases, wanted input into how they could improve their response to a protest,

participants reiterated that they could have provided information to the police prior to the protest that might have reduced tensions or assisted the police in achieving their public safety mandate in ways that did not antagonise the protesters. Again, participants expressed the benefits of the police trusting them to include the police in the planning process and to participate with the police in ways that allowed the protesters to express themselves, while allowing the police to maintain public safety and to limit the disruption that a protest might have on the public.

Not surprisingly, the efforts to foster stronger and closer ties between communities and the police are highly nuanced and fraught with challenges. Despite a strong desire to establish a meaningful and collaborative relationship with the police, many participants highlighted the need to maintain a certain level of distance between the police and their respective communities. One participant was very explicit. They indicated that they had specifically asked that the relationship between the community group and the police not be publicized. Of note, in this case, the request was honored by the police. They expressed concerns that making some relationships known with the police only served to make the police look good or that they were engaged in a beneficial partnership when there was, in fact, much more work that needed to be done by both sides to establish a truly meaningful partnership. Another participant suggested that, as a representative of the community, they could not ever be seen as working too closely with the police. They wanted to serve as a conduit between their community and the police, to facilitate conversations, and provide useful and timely information, but they feared that appearing to be too close to the police would undermine their credibility, and, in turn, their ability to serve their community. **In effect, while the relationships between the police and communities remain essential, they must be developed in a manner that suits the purposes of both the police and the group or community**.

CHOOSING LIAISON OFFICERS WITH THE RIGHT BACKGROUNDS AND SKILLS

Recognizing that the liaison process requires a cultural shift in policing, participants pointed to a very important caveat in the process; namely, who the police use as a DLT member or CLO matters. Put another way, the potential success of liaison efforts is very much dependent on the individuals doing the work, on both sides. From the perspective of participants, for the liaison process to be successful, the police must ensure they select the right type of person to assign to liaison roles. The participants identified several key qualities, many of which were also identified by the police participants in this study. From the perspective of community participants, the most basic prerequisite for being a good liaison officer was simply that they were a good human being. One participant explained that being a good person went beyond their role as a police officer. It involved wanting to make society better for everyone. In addition to this general orientation, the qualities that were perceived as important for a good liaison officer included superior people skills, cultural curiosity, and an openness to learning. There was consensus that liaison work required an emphasis on soft skills and a de-emphasis on hard skills. Several participants linked the ongoing development of soft skills as perhaps the most important facet of training efforts for all officers, including liaison officers.

In addition, participants maintained that the liaison officer should be familiar with the communities they engaged with. There was an overwhelming consensus amongst participants that positive

experiences with the liaison process stemmed from the police selecting liaison officers who were aware of and sensitive to the unique cultural aspects of life in these communities. To the extent that officers came into the community understanding what the community or groups were about and what the various groups and organizations do within the community, the better the chances were that those officers would be able to serve in a collaborative manner. A number of participants mentioned specific officers and provided details about what those officers had done to truly engage with the communities. The participants recognized that these efforts involved going above and beyond what would normally be required of the officer. Of note, participants indicated that officers who engaged in this way were appreciated by the communities, who reciprocated by providing greater trust to the officers.

Finally, a critical element of community engagement was cultural awareness. This was particularly true for Indigenous communities in the context of protest situations. For example, one commonly identified topic was that of sacred fires. Participants frequently mentioned how they routinely offered to educate officers on the importance of cultural practices, arguing that the failure of police to properly respect these practices could easily escalate protest situations into much larger conflicts, and do significant, long-term damage to already tenuous relations. Several participants commented that there was a wide range of diversity among police agencies regarding their level of willingness to adequately address cultural awareness. In effect, some agencies were noted for making good efforts and strides in educating and training officers in cultural awareness, while other were recognized as being far less enlightened on issues of diversity.

Although it was not mentioned directly by participants, there is an important corollary implicit in the discussions; that is, just as building successful partnerships requires a number of preconditions on the part of the police, so too do these collaborations require a genuine willingness to engage on the part of communities. Given the nature of the sample for this study, all participants indicated that, despite some misgivings, they were willing to and often prioritized working with the police on improving relations, even if some participants did not want this fact publicized. However, as noted above, there were several organizations that were disinclined to participate in this research project. Most of the time, they did not offer justifications for their refusals, as is their absolute right. But, it does not bode well for partnership building when some groups choose not to engage with the police at all under any circumstances.

A NOTE ABOUT CONTEXT

By way of summarizing the discussion about police liaison efforts, it is useful to note that liaison work of any kind, be it specific to protests or with communities more generally, takes place in and cannot be separated from the broader relational context. To a significant degree, particular liaison programs and initiatives may be expected to be successful or to fail based on wider police actions and how those are perceived with the community. This ties together several of the points raised throughout this analysis. For example, in general, if police officers are regarded as being overly reliant on hard skills, at the expense of soft skills, this will make the liaison efforts that much more difficult. It does not matter how fruitful are specific liaison efforts if the police are seen more widely in the community as being unresponsive to or uninterested in community concerns. If members of

the community feel they are being re-traumatized because of the way the local police are failing follow-up on cases, this is likely to undo any of the good work accomplished by liaison officers. In short, community liaison efforts are, to an appreciable extent, contingent on a whole of agency approach. Positive police-community relations cannot be developed or maintained by just a handful of dedicated officers. Community outreach is essentially, but it cannot take the place of policing that is systemically geared toward diversity, cultural awareness, respect, and trust.

Recommendations

This report identified several benefits and challenges associated with the liaison process used by police agencies in British Columbia. There are several recommendations that would strengthen the role that DLT members and CLOs play in their communities. The authors of this report recognize that not every community has the need or resources for dedicated DLT members and CLOs. Moreover, police agencies need to consider the delicate balance between people, groups, organisations, and communities that may feel uncomfortable with police officers and the value of DLT members and CLOs in mitigating those concerns. As a result, the recommendations presented below are focused on how to best design and implement a DLT or Community Liaison program. While there were several suggestions highlighted throughout the report, this section focuses on the key recommendations.

UNIT OR TEAM ORGANIZATION

Several participants indicated that evidence-based documentation on how best to build a Division Liaison or a Community Liaison team simply did not exist. In examining the research literature, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to recommend. It is also important to recognize the differences in resources, capacity, and organizational structures between the RCMP and municipal police departments. However, there are some general guidelines that should be considered.

Given the research literature and the information collected from the interviews conducted for this study, it is likely beneficial for every RCMP detachment to have at least one dedicated DLT member and for municipal police departments to have at least one CLO. For all police agencies, the number of resources dedicated to protest group liaison duties should be based on the size of the detachment or department and the number of groups and events that have taken place and are anticipated to occur in the future. The more critical issue is that, at present, the primary responsibilities and duties of DLT members and CLOs are not related to this position. Instead, as outlined above, DLT members and CLOs are removed from their regular duties to serve as liaison members as required. While this report has outlined many of the challenges associated with this approach, it is equally true that there is likely insufficient work directly related to protest issues to justify each RCMP detachment or municipal police department having at least one full-time DLT

member or CLO. However, for many larger and medium sized police agencies[10], especially those in jurisdictions that have a history of protests or active protest and diversity groups, it may be more possible to make the argument that full-time DLT member(s) or CLOs can provide a sufficient return on investment to justify dedicated resources in which liaison work is the primary duty. It would also seem reasonable that the DLT member(s) or CLOs are housed with and form part of the police agency's community policing section.

Moreover, decisions about the utility and value of DLT members and CLOs should not only be based on the matrix of return on investment. In some places, DLT members and CLOs are part of the fabric of a community. Given this, police leaders must also consider when DLT members and CLOs are accessed by the public and ensure that these resources are available in a timely and appropriate fashion. It is important to keep in mind that DLT members and CLOs can certainly assist in achieving organizational goals, such as satisfying the 'client', but also enhancing, in some way, the relationship between the police and the public and the way the public perceives their police. In other words, it is important to understand the more difficult-to-measure notion of the degree to which DLT members and CLOs contribute to a reduction of people's fear of the police and the government, increase the sense of partnership between the community and the police, and a sense that the police positively contribute to one's quality of life. On these measures, in some jurisdictions, it appeared, from the perspective of participants, that DLT members and CLOs do play an important role. In this way, additional consideration should be given to making some members assigned to the DLT as their primary responsibility.

It is important to acknowledge that police agencies, like many institutions, must consistently make difficult choices regarding the allocation of increasingly scarce resources. It is beyond the purview of this report to determine how police agencies should accomplish this task. However, it must be noted that those who participated in this study from the community perceived this resource allocation decision as an indicator of police priorities. Thus, the widespread view that there were not enough liaison officers gets translated into the belief that the police do not take building relationships with our community seriously. Ultimately, police agencies must find ways to fund protest liaison capacity to a level commensurate with the value they purport to place on establishing positive relationships with marginalized communities. It is also recommended that, whenever possible, DLT members and CLOs should be as diverse as the communities they liaise with. While this is not always possible, it is recommended that police agencies attempt to recruit, train, and retain more Indigenous police officers and members of other diversity groups to policing and where their skills and professional interests align, assign these officers to the DLT or CLO teams.

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[10] For the purposes of this report, a medium-sized police agency is defined as one that polices a jurisdiction with a population between 5,000 and 15,000 people. A large police agency is one that polices a jurisdiction with a population of over 15,000 people.

TRAINING

As mentioned above, participants indicated that there was no standard liaison training program. To this end, all police agencies should continue to develop and provide training that highlights the historical context of conflict between the police and specific marginalized groups. The historical root of conflict infuses all aspects of the myriad relationships between the police and marginalised social groups. Protests and demonstrations, therefore, reflect not only current issues, but also what various groups perceive as long traditions of mistrust and mistreatment at the hands of the police. A full appreciation of the impact of these specific histories is required to appropriately respond to potential conflict situations. One way to address this issue in a more meaningful way is to ensure that all police agencies comply with the *Deborah Campbell vs. Police* decision that all officers be adequately and appropriately trained in cultural and Indigenous awareness. While this is currently taking place, it is critical for all police officers to be trained and for refresher courses to be routinely offered to ensure that police promote cultural humility and have a much deeper understanding of the experiences and points of view of a wide range of diversity groups.

One way to address the concern around the cost and resources associated with providing this type of training is to engage with other agencies to share the training. In addition to the aforementioned benefits, sharing the training will also contribute to consistency in the training and a shared knowledge and skill base among participants. Moreover, shared training resources and programs around developing the skills and knowledge necessary to be a successful DLT member and CLO, rather than each municipal department or the RCMP reinventing the wheel by developing their own training program, will contribute to the growing body of information on best practices.

Trauma-informed practices are increasingly being embraced by police agencies. These practices should be incorporated into the protest liaison process as well. It is critical that all DLT members and CLOs be trained in trauma-informed practice. The demonstration of cultural awareness, sensitivity, and responsiveness will help frame the liaison process in a more helpful and positive light. Another key aspect of trauma-informed practice that should not be overlooked is follow-up with the marginalised community. Again, in this regard, protest liaising is the same as any other policing. Follow-up by DLT members and CLOs will be perceived as evidence of respect and will assist in building trust.

Given the nature of liaison work, in addition to cultural sensitivity training and training about diversity and the people and groups in the community, DLT members and CLOs should be trained routinely on conflict management styles, evidence-based de-escalation techniques, negotiation strategies and tactics, active listening skills, and how to respond appropriately to active and passive resistance actions. Moreover, all DLT members and CLOs should be trained on how to use social media effectively, in terms of a tool to communicate with the community, diversity groups, and protest groups. DLT members and CLOs should also be trained on how various groups use different open-source social media platforms to communicate with each other and the public, and how the police can use these platforms to obtain information about various groups, individuals, and events.

It is also important for DLT members and CLOs to have a formalized feedback mechanism through which officers and their agencies learn from each other, in terms of successes and failures. Many participants indicated that they were not aware of any formal structures through which the

conversations that DLT members or CLOs have with individuals and groups are incorporated into the knowledge and decision-making processes of senior management. Participants were also unaware of any empirical data that was being collected about the activities of DLT members or CLOs or the activities of those policing protests that could be used to validate the strategies and tactics being used. Because there is much that can be learned by making and correcting mistakes, it is important that there is some process, beyond an after-action report or the information recorded by DLT members and CLOs about their interactions or activities, that police leaders, DLT or Community Liaison managers, and the officers themselves can access to learn what has worked and what strategies, techniques, policies, or activities do not work. As this area of policing is constantly evolving, it is important that there is a learning process in place that is directly connected to the training of DLT members and CLOs.

BUILDING SUCCESSFUL LIAISON PROCESSES CENTRED ON TRUST

As discussed throughout this report, the key principle for success in the liaison process is establishing and maintaining trust between the police, the protest group, and the community. In this, it is critical for the police to understand and expect that developing a meaningful level of trust takes time and is a long process that will likely be tested at various times. In the case of marginalised or protest groups, conflict is primarily manifested as a lack of trust in the police. Thus, in their interactions with these groups, DLT members and CLOs must work to re-establish trust. In terms of protest liaison efforts, this would include adhering to some basic trust-building principles, such as: communicating effectively, a willingness to give and take, being true to one's word, being consistent in one's actions and words, offering respect, giving others the benefit of the doubt, and admitting individual and organizational mistakes. Again, it is important that DLT members and CLOs and their respective police agencies understand that the process of building trust will take time. It is natural for DLT members and CLOs to want to see results from their efforts quickly. But, in terms of protest liaising with marginalised communities, this is an unrealistic expectation. Instead, police agencies need to be committed to engaging with people and groups over an extended period of time and they must be prepared to put in all of the hard work necessary to build trust and communication. Although many community participants readily acknowledged that the police were doing better on this issue, they also maintained that much work remained to be done. As a first step, police need to review DLT actions and debrief members to ensure that the principles noted above are being followed routinely. As well, consistent with the earlier focus on feedback, police agencies should, as a matter of policy, provide written updates on the resolution of civilian complaints, if they do not do so already. Moreover, police agencies should, to the greatest degree possible, involve complainants in the resolution process.

ALIGN POLICE POLICIES AND PRACTICES WITH THE NEEDS AND CONCERNS OF MARGINALISED COMMUNITIES

A consistent complaint voiced by the community participants in this project was that police agencies were more interested in identifying what they perceived as issues and in setting their own priorities. However, these issues and priorities did not always match those of the community. Given

this, DLT members and CLOs and their respective police agencies should be more proactive in gathering community input and should institute more robust mechanisms for receiving input. One example would be community meetings. Rather than the police often approaching these meetings with a pre-determined agenda that they have set, some community meetings could be dedicated only to receiving input from community members. This input should then be incorporated into subsequent initiatives and meetings. This would help the police to better identify and anticipate issues that could serve as the bases for protests. While there are many formal and informal mechanisms for the community to provide information to the police or to voice their concerns about issues that are important to them, having DLT members and CLOs participate in routine meetings with various diverse groups and organizations to better understand their points of view would contribute to establishing a greater sense of trust, and incorporate the issues raised in these meetings into actual policies and practices would contribute to maintaining trust.

Another way to solicit regular feedback from the public is to survey their opinions more routinely. Police agencies could disseminate a regular survey with members of the public on their perceptions of various issues, police engagement on these issues, and satisfaction with the police. Information could be collected via a survey mailed to residents or conducted online once per year, for example. Private and public meetings could then serve as a forum to provide feedback on the results to the surveys and to discuss approaches to addressing the most commonly raised concerns. In addition, information on the strategies used by the police to address specific community concerns could be shared.

CREATE TRULY COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROTEST GROUPS, THE COMMUNITY, AND THE POLICE

Participants were very clear that the relationship between DLT members and CLOs and protest groups, in addition to the relationship between the police and marginalised communities, needed to move away from being police-driven towards more of an equal partnership between the parties. Consistent with the previous recommendation, marginalized groups felt that the police too often dictated terms, including the terms of protest. With regards to protests, given the role of DLT members and CLOs, the police should not only expect consultation, but should always be engaged in conversation. To that end, some comprise is likely to be required by both parties. Approaches to liaising premised on hierarchical precepts, such as the police ultimately setting the terms, will likely not be received in a positive way, and will not produce the desired outcome. One example that was mentioned by several participants was the protocol for meetings between the police and community groups. First, it should not always be the case that the community must come to a venue selected by the police. Community members are wary of always having to come onto the police's "home turf". Instead, the police sometimes need to allow community members themselves to determine where meetings and discussion will be held. Similarly, participants expressed resentment that the police generally served as the chairs of these meetings. Again, this was perceived as a means of controlling the agenda. At a minimum, these meeting should always involve a co-chairperson from the community, or one could alternate who hosts the meeting. Even better, efforts should be made to have some meetings chaired by a community member selected by the community itself.

Conclusion

The police agencies that participated in this research were all very much aware of the changing dynamics in relationships between the police and the communities they serve. The need to work more closely with communities in general, and with community groups and protest groups wishing to express their grievances, has become a central policing consideration. In response, police agencies have begun to incorporate liaison work into practice. These efforts have produced notable successes, particularly from the perspective of the police. The perspectives of community members from historically marginalized groups were more mixed. Many recognized that police agencies were trying to improve outreach and liaison efforts. Still, there remain a number of areas of concern.

In the specific context of protest liaison efforts, the stakes are enormous. This is particularly true in the aftermath of the George Floyd murder in the United States, and the subsequent spotlight on police interactions with communities, especially marginalised communities. Given the profound social changes being witnessed and occurring across Canada, the United States, and elsewhere, there is a wide-spread consensus that the level of protesting is unlikely to dissipate in the foreseeable future. In these highly charged circumstances, miscalculations or missteps by the police can rapidly escalate and produce disastrous outcomes. While police agencies face daunting challenges on numerous fronts, interactions with marginalised communities should continue to rate among their highest priorities.

Taking a step back, it is vitally important to consider protest liaison work in the larger context of policing generally. Marginalized communities and protest groups see police responses in their totality. Consequently, when members of these communities witness specific behaviours by police officers that they find concerning, it paints all of policing in a negative light, even if they have previously established a positive relationship with DLT members or CLOs. For example, some community participants reported feeling that the police had ignored them and failed to respond to particular incidents of concern. This sentiment can have the effect of jeopardizing all police efforts, not just those of DLT members or CLOs. Police protest liaison efforts can, therefore, be undermined not only by the conduct of DLT members and CLOs, but also by external events. Put another way, successful protest liaising is, to large degree, contingent on improvements in police relationships with marginalised communities and members of protest groups more generally.

Research Limitations

Given that the focus of this study was police liaison efforts in the context of protests, a clear limitation to this report is the absence of participants actively involved in protests. Despite the researchers' best efforts, the authors of this report were unable to secure interviews with individuals from protest groups, or those that could speak about the specific context of protests. As the authors' attempts to reach out to many individuals and organizations did not receive any responses, the authors cannot provide any explanation as to why these individuals or groups were unwilling to participate in this study. Fortunately, the authors were able to interview participants

from marginalized groups. These interviews, although focused on police liaison efforts more generally, revealed critical information about how these individuals and groups intersected with the police and, in some instances, with DLT members or CLOs. It does not seem unreasonable to extrapolate from these perspectives. There are doubtlessly nuances involved in the specific context of protest liaising that were not captured during these interviews, but the authors of this report maintain that the key insights provided by the community participants are, nonetheless, relevant to police protest liaison efforts. Understanding and appreciating historical conflict between the police and marginalized groups, highlighting the importance of trust and collaboration, focusing on trauma-informed practices, and ensuring sufficient resource are allocation to police liaison efforts are all central elements of any police approaches to building relationships with marginalised individuals and communities. Police initiative directed toward protest liaison efforts can thus benefit substantially from the insights gleaned from these interviews.

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